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MAKING IT EASIER TO MILK THE COW: THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK COLLAPSES THE CULPABLE
PARTICIPATION DOCTRINE AND SIDESTEPS
THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The initial public offering ("IPO") frenzy occurring between 1998
and 2000, and the subsequent IPO collapse, continues to spawn litigation
at a feverish pace. 1 Considered one of the most extreme examples of a
hot issue market-one in which the prices of IPO stocks rise quickly in the
market-the recent IPO boom is now the subject of intense scrutiny and
massive class action litigation. 2 Although warning sirens began to wail
early in the IPO explosion, the continued success of the stock market overshadowed much of the concern over the impetus for such historic price
increases. 3 This changed, however, as stock prices plummeted and reports
1. See Randall Smith, New Inquiries Are Targeting IPO "Spinning",WALL ST. J.,
June 30, 2003, at Cl (noting courts are deluged with cases resulting from IPO
crash); Shawn Tully, Will Wall Street Go Up in Smoke?, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2001, at 36
(describing plaintiffs' attorneys rush to IPO class actions). Tully compares the potential lucrative settlements resulting from recent IPO class action suits to those
handed to plaintiffs' attorneys bringing claims against tobacco companies. See id.
(warning that litigation surrounding IPO boom may become "class action bonanza"). One attorney for a leading plaintiffs' attorney law firm is quoted as saying, "The courts are now deluged with cases, and the regulators have just scratched
the surface." See Smith, supra, at C1 (anticipating proliferation of lengthy and burdensome litigation resulting from market bubble scandals); see also Tamara Loomis, Judge to Weigh Dismissal of IPO Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 2002, at I
(describing litigation related to IPO allegations as "flourishing all over the country"); Joanna Glasner, Hot New IPO Trend: Suing, WIRED (June 6, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/ipo/0,1350,44250,00.html (describing sweeping investigations and increasing number of lawsuits in response to IPO boom and bust).
2. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 300-08
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (demonstrating enormity of class action suits); see, e.g., id. at 306
(describing IPO market of 1998 to 2000 as more extraordinary than previous three
hot issue markets). See generally Jay R. Ritter, The "Hot Issue" Market of 1980, 57 J.
Bus. 215 (1984) (describing elements of hot issue market); see alsoJay R. Ritter, Big
IPO Runups of 1975-September 2000 (Aug. 2001), at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/runup750.pdf [hereinafter Big IPO] (providing statistical data on IPO boom
and first day trading price increases); cf. Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 1, at 159-62 (1963)
(summarizing findings regarding hot issue market of 1959-1962).
3. See Dominic Basulto, The IPO Controversy, pt. III, at http://www.corante.
com/reports/ipo/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2004) (referencing Internet IPOs: An Insider's Game, MCgINSEY

Q.,

2000 No. 1). The McKinsey report recognized the dan-

gerous trends involved in the IPO boom. See id. (describing analysis undertaken in
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began to surface that the record-shattering IPO market may have been
rigged.4 In response to these widespread allegations and recent govern5
ment probes, investors and plaintiffs' attorneys have flooded the courts.
McKinsey Quarterly, which discusses IPO boom). "'But crackling behind the song,
you can hear the distortions of a market that has primarily rewarded insiders and
short-term investors .... '" Id. "In a bull market, these investment banking practices generated little or no regulatory attention. As long as the shares of hot IPO
companies continued to trade at a higher price, all parties concerned . . .could
profit from the ongoing technology boom." Id. at Introduction; see also Brian
Trumbore, The Bubble, Part II, at http://www.buyandhold.com/bh/en/education/
history/2002/bubble-2.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2004) (providing weekly review
of financial markets and major events betweenJanuary 8, 2000, andJune 3, 2000).
The author revisits previous postings on his website to expose the clear warning
signs regarding overvalued stocks in 2000. See id. (presenting comments from author's previous columns). Of particular note is a quote from Warren Buffet, who
was notably conservative during the hot issue market, taken during an annual
meeting of Berkshire Hathaway: "In the past year [1999-2000], the ability to monetize shareholder ignorance has never been greater." See id. (explaining his perception that media hype and bullish outlooks allowed issuing companies to capitalize
on investors' willingness to enter securities markets without understanding reasons
for rise in prices).
4. See Was IPO Frenzy Rigged? (Nov. 13, 2002), at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2002/11/13/6011/printable529225.shtml (noting that some insiders claim
price leaps in IPOs were result of insider agreements). An often-used technique
called "laddering" is held primarily, but not solely, responsible for the IPO boom
by many accounts. See id. (explaining use and frequency of laddering agreements
during recent hot issue market). Laddering is defined as follows:
Laddering-Technique for driving up the price of shares after the IPO.
Essentially, underwriters offer shares at the offering price (which is almost always lower than the initial trading price) in exchange for guarantees from buyers to purchase additional shares at progressively higher
prices after the opening. Each higher price, then, forms the next "rung"
on the ladder.
Basulto, supra note 3, pt. IV (providing glossary of terms related to IPO practices
and schemes). The mechanics of the technique are widely known and often described as commonplace. See Nicholas W. Maier, OriginalSin (May 13, 2002), at
http://www.dotcomscoop.com/sin.html (providing account from employee at
Cramer & Company detailing laddering scheme). The author highlights the precise behavior, artificially driving the price of IPO stocks up, being targeted in recent litigation. See id. (same). See generally Gregg Wirth, The Bubble That Wasn't
(Feb. 4, 2002), at http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.dfm/ID/5074/ (describing
driving forces underlying IPO boom). "It was really a bubble created by Wall
Street for the enrichment of Wall Street ...." Id.

5. See Suzanne Miller, Banks UnderLegal Siege, BANKER (Mar. 2003), at http://
www.thebanker.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/250/Banks-under__legal-siege.html
(describing current legal siege of banks). "An army of lawyers representing scores
of banks and thousands of plaintiffs are squaring off for a battle where tens of
billions of dollars in claims are at stake." Id. The author describes at length, with
the assistance of bankers and plaintiffs' attorneys, the atmosphere in the United
States following the IPO collapse and the pending legal battles. See id. (discussing
nationwide effect of IPO collapse). Summarizing the feeling on Wall Street, one
lawyer stated, "It seems there's no end in sight." See id. (explaining numerous legal
challenges facing Wall Street and dangers associated with going to trial); see also
Loomis, supra note 1, at I (noting importance of government probes in increasing
litigation). Initial complaints alleging abuses in the context of IPOs did not receive support. See id. (describing response to initial complaints filed in courts in
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The legal strategies employed in an effort to recover damages from those
participating in the IPO schemes vary; however, one of the most important
and controversial strategies is the use of Section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19346 ("Exchange Act") .7 In one of the largest private
securities class actions in the history of the United States, the Southern
District of New York addressed the debate concerning the controlling person liability pleading requirements of Section 20(a).8
In In re InitialPublic Offering Securities Litigation ("IPO Litigation"),° the
Southern District of New York sent a shockwave through Wall Street as it
contradicted two of its own decisions regarding controlling person liability.' 0 Attempting to extinguish the controversy surrounding the pleading
various jurisdictions). "[A] steady stream of headline-making government probes
have given lawsuits a huge boost in the arm." Id.; cf Thomson v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter & Co., No. CIV. 01-7071-MP, 2001 WL 958925, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
21, 2001) (dismissing related securities class action, targeting research analysts, including well-known analyst Mary Meeker). Judge Milton Pollack presented his
view of the plaintiffs' complaint:
The pleading improprieties in the complaint are gross and unrestrained .... The repetitive character of the improprieties is unmiti-

gated. A collection of market gossip pervades the endless stream of news
organization tidbits which are spread throughout. Generally, these are
expectable comments of the gamblers in the world's gaming pits depending on the season. They come during the inevitable sequel after the market boom periods.
Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (2000)).
7. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 308-14 (highlighting various legal strategies available to damaged investors); see also id. at 392-93
(noting deep division among circuits over whether Section 20(a) has scienter element). See generally Sandra P. Wysocki, Note, ControllingPersonalLiability of Directors
Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. Rrv. 695,
705-06 (1998) (discussing Congress's goals in enacting Securities Acts and investors' remedies under Securities Acts).
8. See Dan Ackman, IPO Settlement Does Not Settle Much (june 26, 2003); at
http://www.forbes.com/2003/06/26/cxda.0626ipo.html (outlining proposed
settlement between plaintiffs' attorneys representing shareholders and insurers for
Issuers); see also Investors Settle with Internet Companies in IPO Suits (June 26, 2003), at
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aMBLzCTbeld&refer=-US# (providing summary and analysis of settlement as well as potential implications for defendant banks). "A proposed settlement announced today.., offers
plaintiffs a guaranteed minimum recovery of $1 billion. ... " Ackman, supra. According to Melvyn Weiss, head of the committee of shareholder lawyers, an agreement to the proposed settlement would result in one of the largest settlements in
history. See id. (detailing terms of proposed memorandum of understanding and
distinguishing impact on issuer companies from underwriters); see also Steve
Maich, Wall Street Readies to Pay Up-Again: IPO Class Actions: Brokerages May Pay US
$3-Billion to Settle Suits Quickly, NAT'L PosT, Feb. 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL
11546410 (describing enormity of decision in securities class action).
9. 241 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
10. See id. at 396-97 (summarizing holding of case and noting abrogation of
prior decisions). The court overruled its holdings in In re Independent Energy Holdings PLC Securities Litigation and Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc. See id.
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requirements for controlling person liability and the application of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")," the court denied a
motion to dismiss claims alleged under Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act. 12 Specifically, the court in IPO Litigationheld that proof of scienter is
not required to adequately plead controlling person liability and that the
PSLRA does not apply to Section 20(a) claims. 13 In doing so, the court
squarely addressed two controversial legal issues: (1) whether Section
20(a) requires pleading a culpable state of mind and (2) whether the
heightened pleading requirements set forth under the PSLRA apply to
Section 20(a) allegations. 1 4 The Southern District of New York's decision
fueled the national debate regarding the pleading requirements under
Section 20(a) and the PSLRA. 15 Moreover, this holding potentially
(holding that neither Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) nor Rule
9(b) apply to Section 20(a) claim); see also id. at 397 (describing decision to abrogate prior rulings).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000).
12. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 295-98 (summarizing holdings of case). "Because Plaintiffs have adequately alleged control, the Section 20 claims survive [the motion to dismiss] ....

In sum, Plaintiffs have pled a

coherent scheme by Underwriters, Issuers, and their officers to defraud the investing public. As such, these lawsuits may proceed." Id. at 298. See generally id. at 39396 (discussing application of PSLRA, Section 20(a) and split among circuits regarding these issues).
13. See id. at 295-98 (summarizing holdings of case).
14. See id. at 392-93 (framing issues before court in hearing defendants' motions to dismiss); see also Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Requirementsfor Pleading Securities Fraud, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 25, 1995, at 3 (describing importance and
controversy surrounding pleading requirements for plaintiffs asserting federal securities claims). "The issue at stake ... is one of extreme importance that has been
painstakingly developed and refined by district courts and circuit courts ....
Id.
The Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to review the pleading standard
established by the PSLRA. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 29.12, at 1721 (2002) (noting Supreme Court was presented with petition
for certiorari during term commencing October 2000); id. at 1722-24 (detailing
basis for and denial of petition for certiorari); see also Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300
(2d Cir. 2000), petitionfor cert. filed, Sept. 19, 2000 (No. 00-432) (seeking Supreme
Court review).
15. See generally James Lockhart, Annotation, Liability of Brokerage Firm, Securities Underwriter,Investment Advisor, or Similar Entity, or Individual Affiliated with Such
Entity, as "ControlPerson" Under § 15 of Securities Act (15 U.S. C. § 77o) and § 20(a) of
Securities Exchange Act (15 US.C. § 78t(a)), 186 A.L.R. FED. 169, § 4, at 205 (2003)
(including holding in In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig. in section regarding less
specificity in pleading requirements); Arthur R. Miller, Comment, The PretrialRush
to Judgment: Are the "LitigationExplosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1133-34
(2003) (describing problems with balancing judicial efficiency and litigants' ability
to gain full access to hearing). One commentator quoted ajudge's articulatation
of the issue as follows:
On the one hand, there is the interest in deterring fraud in the securities
markets and remedying it when it occurs ....

On the other hand, there

is the interest in deterring the use of the litigation process as a device for
extracting undeserved settlements ....
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awarded plaintiffs' attorneys and private litigants a significant victory while
16
eviscerating the protections established under the PSLRA.
This Note considers the recent developments in the pleading requirements for claims brought under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as well
as the increasing importance of this section. 17 In particular, it examines
the Southern District of New York's decision in IPO Litigation.13 This ruling provides an ideal backdrop for defining the interaction between the
PSLRA and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act due to its size, potential for
extraordinary damage awards, jurisdiction and historical context.' 9 This
Note focuses primarily on the requirements for pleading a Section 20(a)
Elliott J. Weiss, Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (2001)
(quoting In reTime Warner, Inc., Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993) (Newman, CJ.)). "The importance of Second Circuit jurisprudence on this subject is
reflected by the fact the Second Circuit is now the circuit where the largest number of securities class actions are filed." Richard Slack & Sirin Thada, Control Person
Liability Under the Exchange Act; Possible Shift in Standard in S.D.N. Y, Bus. SEC. LITIGATOR, at 6 n.2 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.
nsf/Files/BSLNov03/$file/BSLNovO3.pdf.
16. See Lyle Roberts, The Perfect Storm (June 19, 2003), at http://www.thelOb5daily.com/archives/000102.html (describing potential narrowing application of
PSLRA); see also Timothy E. Hoeffner & Ashish D. Gandhi, Enron Court Clarifies
Pleading Standardfor Individual Representatives of a ProfessionalAccounting Firm, 15
SEC. REFORM ACr LITIG. RrP. 22, 24-26 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.saul.
com/articles/Litigation/art_2003_04.pdf (describing negative implications for defense counsel resulting from reducing application of PSLRA).
17. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393-97 (analyzing
pleading requirements under Section 20 (a)). The court abrogated two of its own
cases with respect to the pleading requirements set forth under the PSLRA. See id.
at 396-97 (overruling prior holdings); see also Hoeffner & Gandhi, supranote 16, at
22-23 (explaining recent developments in pleading requirements).
18. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (summarizing
court's ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to adequately plead
Section 20(a) claims).
19. See Steve Maich, supra note 8 (describing silence on Wall Street as "almost
deafening" after federal court ruled class action lawsuit can proceed). One commentator estimated the magnitude of damages facing Wall Street at $3 billion,
which would likely be spread across the more than fifty investment banks named in
the class action. See id. (discussing commentator's guess as to amount of damages
facing Wall Street due to class action lawsuit); see also Ackman, supra note 8
(describing terms of proposed settlement between class of plaintiffs and issuer of
defendants' insurers). The settlement guarantees a minimum recovery of $1 billion from the insurers of the issuer defendants; however, the case will proceed
against the fifty-five investment bank defendants. See id. (discussing minimum settlement recovery for cases against fifty-five underwriters). Melvyn Weiss, head of
the committee of shareholder lawyers, noted that this would place this settlement
among the largest securities class action settlements ever. See id. (providing Weiss's
view about relative size of settlement); see also In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig.,
241 F. Supp. 2d at 306-08 (providing historical context surrounding case before
Southern District of New York). Judge Scheindlin noted that the economic successes and failures during this period-1998 to 2000-have been documented by
numerous books, several documentaries and at least one play. See id. (discussing
extensive media coverage of recent IPO market).
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claim. 20 Part II provides the historical framework, legal background and
legislative history required for an understanding of the inquiry involved in
the IPO Litigationcase. 2 1 Part III.A. outlines the specific facts and relevant
history of the IPO Litigation case. 22 Part III.B. establishes the district
court's reasoning in holding that Section 20(a) claims do not require
proof of a requisite state of mind at the pleading stage and therefore need
not satisfy the requirements of the PSLRA. 23 Part III.C. critically examines
the court's analysis and its resulting conclusions. 24 Part IV addresses the
potential impact of the holding in IPO Litigation on the future of controlling person liability and, more generally, the potential increase in secondary liability exposure under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act in the
event the PSLRA is circumvented. 25 Finally, Part V sets forth brief conclu26
sions based on the analysis contained within this Note.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Overview of the Securities Acts

From 1929 until 1933, the U.S. securities markets lost half their total
value and twenty percent of the U.S. workforce was unemployed. 27 In re28
sponse, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")
and the Exchange Act (collectively, "Securities Acts") to protect the integ20. For a detailed discussion of the division over pleading requirements for a
Section 20(a) claim, see infra notes 59-149.
21. For a further discussion of the pleading requirements established for
claims alleging violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act and, more generally, the federal securities laws and the PSLRA, see infra notes 27-149 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the facts of In re Initial Public Offering Securities
Litigation, see infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
23. For a narrative discussion of the Southern District of New York's reasoning in In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, see infra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
24. For a critical discussion of the the Southern District of New York's reasoning in In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, see infra notes 177-201 and
accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the possible impact of In re InitialPublic Offering
Securities Litigation on secondary liability exposure under Section 20(a), see infra
notes 202-11 and accompanying text.
26. For conclusions based on the foregoing analysis, see infra notes 212-15
and accompanying text.
27. See Laura Greco, Note, The Buck Stops Where?: Defining Controlling Person
Liability, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 169, 169-75 (1999) (providing background information
on enactment of Securities Acts); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
195 (1976) (describing Securities Acts and underlying legislative intent). "The
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of
stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in
over-the-counter markets .... " Id.
28. Pub. L. No. 73-22, ch. 38, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994)).
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29
Conrity of the securities markets and to combat fraudulent practices.
gress believed the abuses within the securities markets were largely
responsible for the bull market crash of the 1920s and, more specifically,
the 1929 stock market crash.3 0 With this in mind, the Securities Acts
3
sought to end the ineffective self-regulation of the securities markets. '

The Exchange Act created five explicit provisions designed to curb
the practices Congress discovered during its investigations. 3 2 Among
these provisions, Congress included Section 20(a) to address the potential
liability of those individuals in controlling relationships with the primary
violators of the Exchange Act. 3 Section 20(a) attempts to "extend liability to persons who might not be covered by common-law secondary liability" by imposing joint and several liability on persons who "control"
29. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298-99
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (outlining intent of Securities Acts); see also Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 33-35 (3d ed. 1995) (providing background information on Securities Acts).
30. See generallyJ.S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR,LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES Acr or 1933 AND SECURITIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973)
(describing congressional investigations into practices underlying securities trading and detailing legislative history of Securities Acts). These investigations repeatedly uncovered market manipulation and deceptive practices that Congress
believed contributed to the market collapse. See id. (discussing results and implications of congressional investigations); see also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at
34-35 (describing purpose of Securities Acts). The Securities Act primarily focuses
on the initial distribution of securities rather than the subsequent trading transactions, while the Exchange Act focuses on trading occurring after the initial distribution, specifically disclosure requirements. See id. (discussing regulatory focus of
Securities Acts).
31. See Greco, supra note 27, at 169 (describing structural flaws of Wall Street
and pitfalls of self-regulation); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963) ("[A] fundamental purpose, common to these statutes, was to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and
thus to achieve a higher standard of business ethics in the securities industry.");
Wysocki, supra note 7, at 705-06 (describing Congress's intent in enacting Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Congress's broad disclosure requirements and antifraud provisions signaled a dramatic shift from the status quo of caveat emptor.
See id. (noting philosophical shift resulting from Exchange Act).
32. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 299 n.13 (outlining five explicit provisions creating civil liability under Exchange Act).
The Exchange Act's five explicit provisions include: Section 9, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i (liability for certain manipulations of securities traded on stock exchanges); Section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (liability for short-swing profits);
Section 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (liability for misleading statements in certain
periodic reports filed with the SEC); Section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (liability
for controlling persons); and Section 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994) (liability for insider-trading if plaintiff was a contemporaneous trader).
Id.
33. See Comment, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities
Acts: Towards an Improved Analysis, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1345, 1345-51 (1978) [hereinafter Secondary Liability] ("These provisions were designed to reach situations in
which there are technical legal barriers between the person in fact responsible for
the violations of the securities acts and those injured by violations.").
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primary violators of the Exchange Act.3 4 Specifically, Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act holds liable those individuals who "control"-directly or indirectly-any person who may be liable for a violation of the provisions of
35
the Exchange Act.
Today, courts interpret the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of Section 20(a) liability differently. 36 The federal circuit courts,
and district courts within the circuits, disagree over whether claims
brought under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act require proof of scienter.37 The controversy has resulted in extensive case law examining the
statute and its legislative history, as well as the development of majority
34. Insider Trader and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, H.R. REP.
No. 910-100, at 27 n.23 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6064; see also
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (summarizing intent
underlying addition of Section 20(a) to Exchange Act); 73 CONG. Rc. 6571
(1934) (providing hearings before Commission on Banking and Currency); William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and
Abetting Conspiracy, ControllingPerson, and Agency: Common Law Principlesand the Statutory Scheme, 14J. CoRP. L. 313, 363-64 (1989) (noting that controlling person provision in Securities Act sought to curb use of nominal, or "dummy," directors).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2000) (codifying controlling person liability under
Exchange Act).
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly
or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action.
Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(b)-2(f) (2000) (setting forth SEC definition of "control" for purposes of interpretation of Section 20(a)). "The term control (including the terms controlling, controlled by and under common control with) means
the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of
the management and policies of a person, whether through ownership of voting
securities, by contract, or otherwise." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (parenthetical in original); see also, e.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890 (3d Cir.
1975) (describing lack of statutory definition of "control"). "Congress deliberately
did not define 'control,' thus indicating its desire to have the courts construe the
applicable provisions of the statute along with the evidence adduced at trial." Id.
See generallyJ. Christopher York, Comment, Vicarious Liability of ControllingPersons:
Respondeat Superior and the Securities Acts-A Reversible Consensus in the Circuits, 42
EMORY LJ. 313, 319 (1993) (discussing negative effects of Congress's omission of
statutory definition of control). "A wide variety of defendants have been held subject to liability under the controlling person doctrine, including stockholders, directors, corporate officers, employers, and partners." Id. at 315 n.10.
36. Compare Rochez, 527 F.2d at 890 (interpreting Section 20(a) to include culpable participation requirement), with Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d
1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (analyzing interpretation of Section 20(a)).
37. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 392-94 (framing
issue regarding Section 20(a)); see also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1467-73
(explaining two different paths to "culpable participant" doctrine); Lockhart,
supra note 15, § 4, at 205 (outlining case law and issues relevant to pleading fraud
or state of mind).
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and minority viewpoints. 38 The majority viewpoint states that culpability is
part of the good faith defense expressly provided for in Section 20(a).39
The minority viewpoint states that the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading the requisite state of mind of the controlling person-equatingscienter
with culpable participation-inorder to establish the level of control necessary for Section 20(a) liability. 40 The court in IPO Litigation noted that
resolving the scienter debate is central to determining the applicability of
41
the heightened pleading standard of the PSLRA to Section 20(a) claims.
B.

Background and Application of the PSLRA

In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA, overriding President Clinton's
veto. 42 Supporters of the PSLRA touted the law as "a major victory for
38. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1468-72 (outlining majority and minority viewpoints on controlling person liability); see also, e.g.,
Brown v. Enstar
Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 (l1th Cir. 1996) (examining statute and legislative
history); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1992)
(same); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 896-97 (10th Cir. 1992)
(same); Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1575 (same); G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636
F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Rochez, 527 F.2d at 890 (same).
39. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1468-72 (explaining majority interpretation of Section 20(a)); see also, e.g., Hollinger,914 F.2d at 1575 (explaining majority interpretation and reasoning for adopting two-prong test). For a detailed
discussion of the majority viewpoint, see supra notes 87-100.
40. See Rochez, 527 F.2d at 890 (explaining minority interpretation and reasoning for adopting three-prong test). For a detailed discussion of the minority viewpoint, see supra notes 59-86.
41. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 392-97 (analyzing
requirements for prima facie case under Section 20(a)).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000) (codifying PSLRA). For a discussion of the
PSLRA's passage, see John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw. 335, 335-37
(1996) (describing passage of PSLRA). The Senate voted on December 22, 1995,
to overrule the presidential veto, following a similar vote by the House of Representatives two days earlier. See id. (discussing congressional override and legislation's impact). The President's veto message stated that the bill would "have the
effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate claims." Id.
at 352; see also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1495 n.5 (outlining voting following
President Clinton's veto message). The presidential veto did not change a single
vote in the Senate. See id. (noting that sixty-five senators who originally voted for
PSLRA were joined by three senators who originally abstained). For a detailed
discussion of the legislative history of the PSLRA, see id. at 1268-69, 1495-96. See
generallyJames V. Fazio III, The Motive and Opportunity Test for PleadingScienter Under
the FederalSecurities Laws: Where Is It Now?, 50 FED. LAW. 51 (May 2003) (describing
passage of PSLRA as bipartisan effort); Tamara Loomis, Securities Fraud: Lawyers
Seek Review of a Key Class Action Ruling, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 2000, at 5 (noting securities
defense bar pushed hard for passage of PSLRA); Carl M. Cannon, Letterfrom Washington; Suits v. Suits, FORBEs ASAP (Oct. 7, 2002), at http://www.forbes.com/asap/
2002/1007/018.html (describing media focus on then President Clinton's ties to
plaintiffs' attorney firm, Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, in response to
veto of PSLRA). The media portrayed the PSLRA as "good government," but
many practitioners remained concerned that the roaring economy largely influenced its passage. See id. (noting different views of PSLRA from media and trial
lawyers). The Republican control of both houses of Congress in 1995 was a crucial
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over lawyers who filed . . . frivolous lawsuits, or 'strike

suits.' 43 The primary intent of the PSLRA may be best summarized by a
caricature depicting a cow named "Litigation" being pulled at opposite
ends by a plaintiff and a defendant, while the lawyer happily milks the
4 4
COW.
This perception of securities litigation abuse dominated both the
45
House and Senate debates following extensive testimony on the issue.
In response, Congress enacted the PSLRA with the hopes of limiting
abuses in the system. 4 6 Yet, contrary to popular opinion in Congress,
many questioned the validity of the threat to the securities litigation system. 4 7 Moreover, fears existed that the passage of the PSLRA would lead
component in the passage of the PSLRA. See William S. Lerach, The Chickens Have
Come Home to Roost: How Wall Street, the Big Accounting Firms and CorporateInterests
Chloroformed Congress and Cost America's Investors Trillions (2002), at http://
www.enronfraud.com/pdf/chickens.pdf (discussing historical and political context surrounding passage of PSLRA).
43. Lori Calabro, I Told You So (Sept. 1, 2002), at http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,7612,00.html?f=related (describing PSLRA and initial reaction by many
following passage). For a further discussion on strike suits, see Tim Oliver Brandi,
The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and the ShareholderClass Action,
98 DIcK L. REv. 355 (1994).

44. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1268 (describing oft-cited sketch underlying intent of PSLRA). Senator Bennett argued the concepts described in the
sketch by creating a similar picture with words on December 5, 1995. See id.
(describing Senator Bennett's description of securities fraud class actions as dominated by "professional plaintiffs" with little equity in defendant corporation).
45. See Abandonment of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Securities
Fraud/StaffReport on Private Securities Litigation:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Sec. of
the S. Comm. on Banking Hous., and UrbanAffairs, 103d Cong. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
Subcommittee Hearing] (describing purpose of PSLRA and findings from lengthy
hearings regarding private securities litigation abuses). Senator Dodd, Chairman
of the Securities Subcommittee, described the importance of maintaining an effective litigation system in order to preserve the integrity of the capital markets. See
id. at 17-23 (summarizing testimony given by investors, accountants, executives and
attorneys); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 10498, at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687-88 [hereinafter Senate Report] (detailing studies supporting perception of out-of-control securities litigation
and noting negative implications for capital markets). "The fact that many of
these lawsuits are filed as class actions has had an in terrorem effect on Corporate
America." Id.
46. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 1999)
(describing abuses targeted by PSLRA). The court stated:
The purpose of the Act was to restrict abuses in securities class-action
litigation, including: (1) the practice of filing lawsuits against issuers of
securities in response to any significant change in stock price, regardless
of defendants' culpability; (2) the targeting of "deep pocket" defendants;
(3) the abuse of the discovery process to coerce settlement; and (4) manipulation of clients by class action attorneys.
Id.
47. See Avery, supra note 42, at 33940 (describing testimony given by many as
anecdotal). The author stated that much of the empirical evidence regarding the
widespread abuses in the private litigation system was inconclusive. See id. (noting
that evidence did not demonstrate that warrantless class action suits had exploded); see also Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45, at 167-69 (summarizing conclusions about abuse of private securities litigation based on testimony from
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to increases in securities fraud and investor losses. 48 Irrespective of the
conclusions regarding the securities litigation explosion, the enactment of
the PSLRA was an extraordinary event in the history of securities regulation. 49 Its passage represented a major shift away from investor
50
protection.
Based on the perception of abuse of the securities litigation system
and perceived increase in private securities litigation, the PSLRA codified
several heightened pleading requirements. 5 1 Congress recognized the varied pleading standards being applied to claims of securities fraud in the
investors, corporate executives, accountants and attorneys). Much of the evidence
relied upon by the congressional committees has been subjected to criticism. See
generally William S. Lerach et al., Sea Changes in Private Litigation: Securities Class
Action Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SC09 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 439 (July 24, 1997) (describing Congress's heavy reliance on Janet Cooper Alexander's study on securities litigation settlements in connection with passage of PSLRA) (citing Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991)).
48. See Lerach, supra note 42 (explaining that consumer, worker and investment groups warned of potentially negative effects of PSLRA).
49. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1495 (describing significance of passage of PSLRA in historical context of securities regulation). "The Private Securities Litigation Act is now the law of the land. This is the most momentous event in
the history of securities regulation since the adoption of the Securities Acts in 1933
and 1934." Id.
50. See id. (describing shift in attitude towards investors expressed within
PSLRA). "The act is likely to be seen in retrospect as a defining moment in which
the Securities Acts veered from an emphasis on investor protection to investor
beware." Id. "The procedural barriers which the '95 [PSLRA] . ..Act installed to
obstruct plaintiffs seeking relief under federal securities laws seriously eroded investor protection." Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary
Duty of Delaware Corporations'Directorsin the Wake of Malone, 6 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN.
1, 36 (2000) (describing PSLRA's adverse effect on investor protection). Specifically, critics point to the application of the PSLRA in the Ninth Circuit as a representation of the negative implications for investors. See Lerach, supra note 42
(detailing historical use of PSLRA in Ninth Circuit). "Seventeen times in a row,
using the PSLRA, th [e Ninth Circuit] has sided with corporate interests and closed
the courthouse door to defrauded investors." Id.
51. See Senate Report, supra note 45, at 4 (describing purpose and summary of
PSLRA). Congress referenced substantial testimony heard before it that described
plaintiffs' lawyers filing suits alleging securities violations merely in the hope that
defendants would settle quickly. See id. (describing consequences of "strike" suits
as chilling corporate disclosures and increasing cost of raising capital). The House
and Senate Committees were provided with evidence regarding the filing of strike
suits. See H.R. CON. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730 (describing testimony provided regarding abusive practices prevalent in
strike suits). The abusive practices committed in private securities litigation
include:
[T]he routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others
whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without
regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only a faint
hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action... (and) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered by
insurance, without regard to their actual culpability.
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circuit courts and attempted to create uniform pleading standards. 5 2 Specifically, if the claim involves a "state of mind" element, the PSLRA re53
quires application of more stringent pleading requirements.
Nonetheless, the pleading requirements established in 1995 remain
controversial; circuit courts, and district courts within many circuits, disagree about the proper interpretation of the pleading requirements. 54 FurId. at 730; see also Avery, supra note 42, at 353-54 (describing measures implemented by PSLRA to deter meritless litigation).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1) (2000) (setting forth heightened pleading requirements). Specifically, this Note addresses Paragraph (b)(2) that establishes
heightened pleading requirements in private actions in which the plaintiff may
recover money damages only if the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. Paragraph (b) (1) provides in pertinent part:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant (a) made an untrue statement of a material fact;
or (b) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances in which they were made,
not misleading; the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, the reasons or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made
on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all
facts on which that belief is formed.
Id. Paragraph (b) (2) provides in pertinent part:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may
recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.
Id.; see also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 329-31
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of PSLRA). But see Loomis, supra note 42 (noting disagreement among circuits regarding pleading requirements under PSLRA). "Five years later [in 2000], if anything, the stated goals
of the Reform Act seem more elusive than ever." Id.
53. See Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner'sView of the Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 283, 323 (1997) (noting that PSLRA requires "higher standard of pleading fraud by private plaintiffs ... than most courts have recognized
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); see, e.g., Mishkin v. Ageloff, No.
CIV.97-2690-LAP, 1998 WL 651065, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998) (holding that
"a plaintiff must come forward with 'proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind'").
54. See Loomis, supra note 42, at 5 (outlining circuit split regarding heightened pleading requirements set forth in PSLRA). The Ninth and Second Circuit
interpretations are at "opposite ends of the spectrum," while the First, Third, Sixth
and Eleventh Circuit interpretations are between the two extremes. See id. (noting
that various interpretations of scienter requirement have undermined Congress's
intent for PSLRA to act as "sure-fire deterrent to securities class actions nationwide"); see also In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (describing
circuit split over whether Section 20(a) has scienter requirement forcing application of PSLRA). Compare In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 310
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (declining to require a showing of culpable participation), with In
re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 741, 770 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (requiring a showing of culpable participation). See generally Joseph A.
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation,54 STAN. L. REv. 627 (2002) (provid-
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thermore, many still criticize the PSLRA's shift away from investor
protection. 55 Some consumer groups have even called for a repeal of the
PSLRA, while many argue there is no connection between the PSLRA and
recent scandals. 56 Efforts to amend, or even repeal, the PSLRA have subsided, but whether the judiciary will limit the power of the PSLRA by narrowing its application remains to be seen. 57 The holding in !POLitigation
ing detailed analysis of interpretations of PSLRA). For analysis of post-PSLRA class
action securities litigation, see Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case
Filings, 2002: A Year in Review, available at http://securities.comerstone.com/ (last
visitedJan. 28, 2004) (providing detailed analysis of class action securities litigation
following enactment of PSLRA). See generally Elaine Buckberg et al., Recent Trends
in Securities Class Action Litigation: Will Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Change the Tides?
(June 2003), available at http://www.nera.com/wwt/publications/6143.pdf (providing detailed data and analysis on securities class action litigation trends regarding PSLRA); id. at 12 (concluding, based on research, that plaintiffs' bar is
pursuing fraud more aggressively since passage of PSLRA); Laura E. Simmons &
Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Post-Reform Act Securities Lawsuits: Settlements
Reported Through December 2002, available at http://www.cornerstone.com/
fram-res.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (providing data on settlements from enactment of PSLRA through 2001). Controlling for the number of public companies in each year, "the likelihood of a public company being sued rose
approximately 40% from 1995 to 2002." Id.
55. See Adam C. Pritchard, Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?,
POL'Y ANALYSIS, Feb. 27, 2003, at I (describing "drumbeat" for examination of
PSLRA and strengthening of plaintiffs' bar). The author noted that calls for the
repeal of the PSLRA have increased following the recent spate of fraudulent behavior at several high profile companies. See id. at 11 (noting calls for repeal despite evidence showing that reform has encouraged lawyers to target suits more
precisely and has reduced costs of defending meritless claims); see also Calabro,
supra note 43, at 3 (quoting William Lerach, name partner at Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach). "[T] here is no question that the '95 Act [PSLRA] emboldened executives to think they could do whatever they wanted." Id.; see also Cannon,
supra note 42 (noting Congress revisited PSLRA following Enron collapse). Specifically, several Democrats in the Senate explored amending the PSLRA, but other
legislative matters diverted their attention. See id. (noting that Congress turned its
attention to increasing corporate responsibility and strengthening SEC powers).
56. See Press Release, Consumer Federation of America (Feb. 15, 2002), at
http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/securdc202.htm (urging Congress to
restore investor confidence by amending PSLRA). "These pleading rules have
been set up to shield wrongdoers from accountability for fraudulent activity." Id.
But see Steve Krausz, Don't Scapegoat Securities Litigation Reform for the Enron Debacle,
STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS AcTION CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 1, 2002), at http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2002/20020401_Headline03_Krausz.htm
(describing calls for amendment of PSLRA "one really bad idea"); Michael A. Perino, Did
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 914 (2002)
(describing debate over role PSLRA played in Enron scandal). "In my view, there
is absolutely no connection that has been shown between the collapse of Enron
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, absolutely none." Rachel
McTague, Pitt Says Don't Change Independence Rules, Favors Much of the House Reform
Bill, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 488 (2002) (quoting Harvey Pitt, former SEC
chairman).
57. See Krausz, supra note 56 (explaining dissipation of calls for amendment
or repeal of PSLRA); see also Pritchard, supra note 55, at 12 (describing impact of
PSLRA on class action litigation).
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may support the argument that the PSLRA is being applied more grudgingly in the wake of recent corporate scandals. 58
C.
1.

The Inter- and Intra-CircuitSplits

The Minority's Three-Part Test

The minority view requires satisfaction of three components to adequately plead a Section 20(a) claim: (1) an underlying primary violation of
the securities laws by the controlled person; (2) control over the controlled person; and (3) a showing that the controlling person was, in some
meaningful sense, a culpable participant in the controlled person's primary violation. 59 Significantly, the minority's three-part test requires that
the allegations contain sufficient facts to show that the controlling person
was a culpable participant in the underlying violation. 60 The number of
circuits supporting this view has declined in recent history, with only the
Third and Fourth Circuits retaining the minority's three-prong test.6 1 Despite the decline in support for the minority view, the issue remains un58. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (holding that
Section 20(a) allegations do not fall under PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements); cf. Stephen Labaton, Now Who, Exactly, Got Us into This?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2002, § 3, at 1 (fearing PSLRA may present obstacle to investors seeking damages).
It is important to note that the factual circumstances underlying the Section 20(a)
claims in In re InitialPublic Offering Securities Litigation may have made it easier for
the court to avoid application of the heightened pleading standards contained in
the PSLRA. See 241 F. Supp. 2d at 395 n.183 ("[E]ven if 'culpable participation'
did entail scienter, Plaintiffs have pleaded it here with respect to those Individual
Defendants liable under Rule 10b-5.").
59. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393-96 (discussing
requirements for "culpable participation" with respect to Section 20(a)).
60. See id. at 393 (announcing minority view with respect to Section 20(a));
Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Controlling Person Liability Under Section
20(a) of the SecuritiesExchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act, 53 Bus. LAw. 1, 67 (1997) (describing minority and majority interpretations of Section 20(a)). The
minority view, by including culpable participation in Section 20(a), requires a state
of mind component, and there has been extensive debate over whether this
mental state equates to scienter. See Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Fin., Inc., 122
F. Supp. 2d 407, 427-28 (describing argument raised by defendants that culpable
participation should receive scienter standard similar to allegations raised under
Section 1Ob-5 of Exchange Act). See generally Michael A. Dorelli, Note, Striking Back
at "Extortionate"Securities Litigation:Silicon Graphics Leads the Way to a Truly Heightened and Uniform PleadingStandard, 31 IND. L. REv. 1189 (1998) (discussing various
standards applied to satisfy scienter in context of securities litigation and controlling person liability).
61. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 393-94 (4th Cir.
1979) (describing plaintiffs pleading requirement as something more than negligence); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding in
favor of three-prong test). The court in Carpenterrelied heavily on cases supporting the minority view and, therefore, is typically viewed as supporting the threeprong test. See id. at 394 (noting intent of Congress to limit liability to controlling
persons) (citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973)).
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resolved among the circuit courts, and most notably among district courts
62
within the Second Circuit.
The Third Circuit supports the minority view with respect to the
pleading requirements under Section 20(a). 63 In Rochez Brothers, Inc. v.
Rhoades,64 the president and director of a private corporation purchased
fifty percent of the issued and outstanding stock of the corporation from
the corporation's vice president without disclosing material information
pertinent to the price of the stock. 65 The president's violation rested on
the failure to relay information to the vice president regarding possible
purchasers of the corporation. 6 6 Relying on a finding of wrongdoing on
the part of the president, the vice president attempted to apply Section
20(a), seeking to expand liability to the corporation. 67 The Third Circuit
relied on two holdings-one from the Second Circuit and one from the
Southern District of New York-in determining that culpability of a controlling person must be proven to impose liability. 68 This holding argua62. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir.
1990) (en banc) (providing example of circuit switching from minority to majority
view despite view within circuit that issue was settled); see also Richard L. Levine &
Nader Mobargha, The Culpable Conduct Requirement in Control Person Claims, Bus.
SEC. LITIGATOR (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.
nsf/Files/BSL Sept/$file/BSL_Sept.pdf (predicting in 2001 that Second Circuit
will adopt minority's three-prong test). The authors' prediction conflicts with the
holding in In re InitialPublic Offering Securities Litigation. See id. (noting split among
Second Circuit district courts regarding what must be alleged to state claim under
Section 20(a)). "A number of district courts in the Second Circuit had taken the
position that Lanza required plaintiffs to establish culpable participation in order
to establish liability under Section 20(a). A number of other district courts in the
Second Circuit held to the contrary." BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1470-71.
63. See generally Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974) (requiring establishment of controlling person's state of mind in order to assess liability
under Section 20(a)).
64. See Rochez, 527 F.2d at 884-85 (requiring culpable participation for liability
under Section 20(a)).
65. See id. at 883 (describing facts of case). See generally Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 60, at 22 (summarizing facts of case).
66. See Rochez, 527 F.2d at 883 (providing background information on case).
The issue before the court was whether a corporation is derivatively liable when its

president has violated the Exchange Act. See id. at 883 (discussing facts of case).
Initially, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania entered
judgment in favor of the president, and the vice president appealed. See id. at 883
(reciting procedural history).
67. See id. at 891 (explaining potential controlling person liability exposure
for corporation but denying to extend it).
Even if we were to determine that MS&R was the "controlling person," we
accept the district court's findings that MS&R acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the acts ....

Having expressed the ne-

cessity of showing culpable participation, we need not further burden the
opinion with more discussion.
Id.
68. See id. at 890 (relying on Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y.
1973)). The court held that controlling person liability cannot be found in the
event there is no knowledge or culpable participation on the part of the control-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004

15

566

Villanova Law
Review, Vol. LAW
49, Iss. 3REVIEW
[2004], Art. 3
VILLANOVA

[Vol. 49: p. 551

bly placed the Third Circuit in the minority even though the court did not
directly address the pleading requirements under Section 20(a).69
Based almost entirely on interpretations of the legislative history of
Section 20(a), the court in Rochez stated that Congress intended to require
culpability in order to impose liability on a controlling person for the underlying securities law violations. 70 The court's argument in favor of this
conclusion was that Congress did not intend to make someone an insurer
for the fraudulent activities of another. 7 1 The court further analogized
the legislative intent underlying Section 15 of the Securities Act to that of
Section 20(a), noting that Section 20(a) was modeled after the Securities
Act. 72 This comparison bolstered the court's holding that findings of lia73
bility require more than mere control.
Despite the Third Circuit's analysis of the legislative history of Section
20(a) and its reliance on the holdings in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.7 4 and
ling person. See id. (upholding lower court ruling). Consistent with the minority
view, the court noted that "[i]naction alone cannot be a basis for liability." Id.
69. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1470 (noting Third and Fourth Circuit's minority interpretation of "culpable participation" as element of "control").
But see Levine & Mobargha, supra note 62, at 3 (explaining that cases relying on
Lanza arguably misinterpret holding in that case). Neither Lanza nor Gordon dealt
with the pleading stage, but instead were describing the elements required to prove
a Section 20(a) claim. See id. (noting neither Lanza nor Gordon addressed whether
plaintiff must plead culpability).
70. See Rochez, 527 F.2d at 889-90 (comparing interpretations of legislative history of Exchange Act). The court noted that it was unable to find anything that
would lead it to believe that Congress's intent in creating liability under the Securities Act was different from the creation of liability under Section 20(a). See id. at
890 (noting proof of culpability required to impose liability).
71. See id. at 890 (describing negative result if culpability not required in establishing controlling person liability); see also In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec.
Litig., 151 F. Supp. 2d 371, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (affirming burden on plaintiff to
plead culpable participation despite good faith defense). But see BLOOMENTHAL,
supranote 14, at 1469-70 (describing Section 20(a) as redundant if culpability and
good faith defense co-exist). Criticizing the holding in Marbuty Management, Inc. v.
Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1980), the author argues that the good faith
defense provided in Section 20(a) eliminates the potential for making someone an
insurer against the securities violations of another. See id. at 1474 (noting that
respondeat superior doctrine may impose liability in absence of culpability).
72. See SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting
purpose of both Sections 15 and 20(a) was to prevent directors from evading liability); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 152-73, at 27 (1933) (noting that Senate draft of Securi-

ties Act proposed "insurer's liability" standard). The Senate version, however, was

not adopted. See Rochez, 527 F.2d at 885 (noting House draft proposed fiduciary
standard imposing liability only on controlling persons who breached duty of
care); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 152-73, at 27 (1933) (detailing legislative history
of House version of Section 15 of Securities Act). For a general discussion on the
legislative history of the Securities Act, see James M. Landis, The Legislative History of
the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
73. See Rochez, 527 F.2d at 890 (comparing similar intent underlying creation
of Section 15 of Securities Act and Section 20 of Exchange Act).
74. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Gordon v. Burr,75 Rochez provides limited guidance in analyzing the holding
in IPO Litigation.76 The court in Rochez did not define "culpable participa77
tion," and the case was decided prior to the enactment of the PSLRA.
The significance of the holding in Rochez is that it appeared to uphold the
three-prong test and, therefore, arguably established precedent for requir78
ing the application of the PSLRA to Section 20(a) claims.
The Fourth Circuit arguably upheld the minority view with respect to
the pleading requirements set forth under Section 20(a).79 In Carpenterv.
Harris, Upham & Co.,8 0 the court heard appeals from a summary judgment

81
order granted pursuant to an action against a securities brokerage firm.
The purchasers attempted to establish that the brokerage firm was a controlling person, as defined by the Exchange Act, in an effort to expose the
82
firm to liability and recover losses suffered as a result of their purchases.
The Carpentercourt held, however, that the brokerage firm was not liable
under Section 20(a). 83 The Fourth Circuit's reliance on Lanza and its interpretation of the legislative history of Section 20(a) in Carpenterfavorthe

75. 366 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
76. See Rochez, 527 F.2d at 890 (describing interpretations of legislative intent
in Second Circuit cases).
77. See id. (requiring plaintiff to show that defendant was culpable participant, but failing to define term). The court offered no definition of the term
throughout the entire opinion. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F.
Supp. 2d 281, 393 n.179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting holding in Rochez requires, but
does not define, culpable participation).
78. Compare In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396-97 (addressing application of PSLRA to Section 20(a)), with Mishkin v. Ageloff, No.
CIV.97-2690-LAP, 1998 WL 651065, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998) (same). Relying on these two cases, the argument with respect to Rochez would be that its adoption of the minority view would result in the application of the PSLRA for the same
reasons set forth in Mishkin. See Mishkin, 1990 WL 651065, at *24-25 (requiring
person to have control over controlled person and showing of conscious misbehavior to show controlling person was "a culpable participant in the fraud" perpetrated by controlled person under Section 20(a)).
79. See Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1979) (requiring proof of something more than negligence to establish controlling person
liability); see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 60, at 25 (noting Carpenter
could support either majority or minority viewpoint). "A leading case in the
Fourth Circuit ...can be interpreted with equal facility either to require or not to
require 'culpable participation.'" Id.
80. 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1979).
81. See id. at 390 (describing facts and procedural history of case). The purchasers sought to hold Harris, Upham liable for losses incurred as a result of the
purchase of unregistered securities through one of Harris's employees. See id. at
390 (outlining facts of case).
82. See id. at 390-91 (outlining allegations raised by appellants and procedural
history of case). The district court granted summary judgment, holding that there
was "no theory which would support a judgment against Harris, Upham based on
actions taken by [the employee] after he left the firm's employ." Id. at 390 (concluding defendant was not "controlling person" under Section 20).
83. See id. at 393-94 (holding controlling person provision contains state of
mind condition). The Carpentercourt held that satisfaction of the state of mind
condition requires something "more than negligence to establish liability." See
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minority view. 84 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit adopted an approach similar to the Third Circuit's approach in Rochez, holding that the intent un85
derlying Section 20(a) was not to create an insurer's liability standard.
Notwithstanding the holding in Carpenter,however, proponents of the majority view cite subsequent Fourth Circuit holdings in support of their
position.
2.

86

The Majority's Two-Part Test

The majority view only requires satisfaction of two components to adequately plead Section 20(a) claims: (1) control by the controlling person
over the individual alleged to have violated the Exchange Act and (2) a
violation by the controlled individual. 87 Specifically, the plaintiff must initially plead that the controlling person actually had "control" and that
supra note 14, at 1470 (describing Third and Fourth Circuit interpretations of culpable participation, as aspect of control).
84. See Carpenter,594 F.2d at 394 (describing intent of Congress in creating
controlling person liability). "Clearly Congress had rejected an insurer's liability
standard for controlling persons in favor of a fiduciary standard." Id.; see also
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890 (3d Cir. 1975) (interpreting legislative
history similarly).
85. CompareRochez, 527 F.2d at 889-90 (arguing that Congress was "unlikely to
permit[ ] liability to be found on something other than culpable participation"),
with Carpenter,594 F.2d at 393-94 (highlighting similarities in interpreting requirements for controlling person liability). The court in each case addressed the exculpatory clause provided in Section 20(a) and held that its inclusion demanded
more than mere control in order to find controlling person liability. See id. (noting requirements of controlling person provisions). Neither court, however, associated this heightened requirement with the defendant's burden of proof. See id.
(placing burden of proof on plaintiff to establish liability). Instead, both courts
appear to require the plaintiff to allege culpable participation. See Rochez, 527 F.2d
at 889 (noting requirement that plaintiff show wrongdoing). But see Paul F.
Newton & Co. v. Tex. Commerce, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115-18 (5th Cir. 1980) (providing extensive analysis on controlling person provisions and legislative history).
The Fifth Circuit in Newton held that " [t]
he inconclusive legislative history of §§ 15
and 20(a) supports neither of the positions advocated by the parties before us on
this appeal." Id. at 1116.
86. See, e.g., Hunt v. Miller, 908 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Carpenteras not requiring culpable participation in controlling person liability claims).
The Carpentercourt noted that the plaintiff is only required to allege that the controlling person failed to maintain an adequate system of internal control or that
the controlling person failed to maintain the system in a diligent manner. See id. at
1215 (explaining holding in Carpenter). But see Carpenter,594 F.2d at 394 (describing holding with respect to controlling person liability and explaining requirements for establishment of good faith defense). The court's continuation of its
reasoning with respect to the exculpatory clause could be used to support the majority view that Section 20(a) claims are bifurcated. See id. (requiring elements of
control as well as affirmative actions to avoid violation of securities laws). The
court stated, "In order to satisfy the requirements of good faith it is necessary for
the controlling person, i.e., the defendant, to show some precautionary measures
were taken to prevent an injury caused by an employee." Id. at 394 (emphasis
added).
87. See generally BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1470 (describing two-prong
majority test); see also, e.g.,
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d
BLOOMENTHAL,
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there was a primary violation by the individual under the "control" of the
Section 20(a) defendant. 88 Interestingly, under the majority view, courts
have held that the burden shifts to the defendant to exculpate himself
from liability by demonstrating good faith, or lack of involvement in the
underlying securities violation. 8 9 The pleading scenario would thus involve the plaintiff pleading control and an underlying violation (the initial
two components noted above) followed by an opportunity for the defendant to establish an affirmative defense of good faith.
In assessing whether there is a state of mind requirement in Section
20(a), a crucial distinction between the majority and minority views is,
therefore, the interpretation of the exculpatory good faith clause contained in Section 20(a).90 Those courts upholding the majority view argue
that requiring the third prong of the minority test-that the controlling
person was, in some meaningful sense, a culpable participant in the controlled person's primary violation-is unnecessary given the existence of
the good faith escape hatch in Section 20(a). 9 1 This interpretation results
in the collapse of the culpable participation requirement and removes
Section 20(a) from the heightened pleading standards set forth under the
PSLRA. 92 The basis for this collapse of the culpable participation compo281, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (requiring defendant to show either good faith or due
diligence for exculpation).
88. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 394-95 (outlining
requirements for pleading case under Section 20(a)).
89. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1469 (explaining majority view
with
respect to good faith provision).
Finding that the defendant controlled the primary violator, of course, is
not dispositive as the defendant still has a good faith defense under Section 20(a). It is of considerable practical significance, however, as it shifts
the burden of proof and, therefore, among other things, makes it more
difficult for a controlling person to obtain a summary judgment.

Id.
90. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 60, at 26 (outlining majority view
and emphasis on role of exculpatory clause). The authors noted that once control
status and an underlying violation have been established by the plaintiff, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate good faith under Section 20(a).
See id. (noting controlling person is liable unless controlling person acted in good
faith); see also, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (noting that proving scienter is required only if defendant presents affirmative defense
of good faith); In re Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 206 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (describing culpability as element of affirmative defense by defendant).
91. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1468 (describing good faith provision
provided in Section 20(a)). The author points out that the reluctance to strictly

enforce controlling person liability under Section 20(a) ignores the fact that "Section 20(a) allows the controlling person to exculpate himself/herself/itself by
showing that s/he/it did not induce the violation and acted in good faith." Id.; see,
e.g., Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980) (supporting incorporation of culpability in good faith defense instead of plaintiff's pleading
requirements).

92. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281 at 396 (outlining implications for PSLRA if Section 20(a) does not contain state of mind pleading requirement).
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nent is the elimination of the requirement that the plaintiff ultimately
prove the defendant's state of mind.9 3 The two-prong test appears firmly
established in the circuits currently composing the majority, despite these
94
courts' initial support of the minority view.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in 1990 evidences the increasing dominance of the majority view. 95 Overruling two of its earlier decisions, the
Ninth Circuit in Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.9 6 "return [ed] to what had
once been the law" and reached a different conclusion with respect to the
pleading requirements set forth under Section 20(a). 9 7 The court in Hollinger took exception to its earlier interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 20(a) and renewed its evaluation of the requirements set
forth under Section 20(a), paying particular attention to the good faith
clause. 98 Responding to fears that this bifurcated interpretation of Sec93. See id. (same); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000) (establishing requirement that heightened pleading standard contained in PSLRA applies in situations in which plaintiff can ultimately recover money damages only on proof of
defendant's state of mind).
94. Compare Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that broker dealer liability does not require showing of culpable
participation), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991), with Buhlerv. Audio Leasing Corp.,
807 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding in favor of culpable participation requirement); see also Lockhart, supra note 15, at 185 (listing cases in Ninth Circuit related
to issue).
95. See Hollinger,914 F.2d at 1574-75 (shifting Ninth Circuit's stance regarding
culpable participation requirement). "Today, however, we hold that a plaintiff is
not required to show 'culpable participation' to establish that a broker-dealer was a
controlling person under § 20(a)." Id.; see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supranote
60, at 25-26 (describing Ninth Circuit's switch to majority "camp" in 1990).
96. 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990).
97. Id. at 1575 (recognizing previous stance and placing burden of pleading
on defendant to prove good faith under Section 20(a)); see also Christoffel v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 668-69 (9th Cir. 1978) (supporting minority view
prior to Hollinger). See generally BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1469 (describing
steps taken by court to clarify culpable participation doctrine). The author argues
that the issue of culpable participation became "entwined" with the issue whether
an individual is a controlling person. See id. (explaining that Hollinger decision
allowed continued confusion regarding culpable participation requirement). The
Ninth Circuit used Hollinger to repudiate any prior holdings upholding this interpretation of Section 20(a). See id. (same).
98. See Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1575 (explaining reversal with respect to interpretation of legislative history and intent underlying Section 20(a)). The court
summarized its latest interpretation by saying, "[Section 20(a)] premises liability
solely on the control relationship, subject to the good faith defense. According to
the statutory language, once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant is a 'controlling person,' then the defendant bears the burden of proof to show his good
faith." Id. But see Buhler, 807 F.2d at 835-36 (describing matter of culpability as
settled). "Given that the securities laws in general were meant to impose liability
we continue to adhere to
only on culpable parties with enforceable control ....
our prior holdings that the common law is supplanted by sections 15 and 20." Id.
at 836. See generallyYork, supra note 35, at 340-45 (describing holding in Hollinger
as capitulation of Ninth Circuit). The minority view appeared firmly established in
the Ninth Circuit until Hollinger. See id. at 340 (noting that minority rule developed over twenty-year period). The author argues that the holding in the Ninth
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tion 20(a) would create an insurer's liability standard, as alluded to in
Rochez and Carpenter, the court in Hollinger relied on the strength of the
exculpatory clause contained in Section 20(a). 99 The court in Hollinger
held that "a plaintiff is not required to show 'culpable participation' to
establish that a broker-dealer was a controlling person under § 20(a)."' 0 0
3.

The Split Between District Courts in the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit has not definitively answered the question
whether a plaintiff must plead a culpable state of mind in connection
with an alleged violation under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.' 0 1
The failure to express a clear holding with respect to the pleading
requirements under Section 20(a) has resulted in a split among
the district courts within the Second Circuit. 10 2
This division
Circuit was "the result of a decision to conform." See id. (stating that court acknowledged it was joining several other circuits).
99. See Hollinger,914 F.2d at 1575 (describing protections against liability contained in good faith defense clause). The court stated:
The mere fact that a controlling person relationship exists does not mean
that vicarious liability necessarily follows. Section 20(a) provides that the
"controlling person" can avoid liability if she acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the violations. By making the good faith
defense available to controlling persons, Congress was able to avoid what
it deemed to be an undesirable result, namely that of insurer's liability,
and instead it made vicarious liability under § 20 (a) dependent upon the
broker-dealer's good faith.
Id.
100. Id. (placing emphasis on good faith provision of Section 20(a)). "Section 20(a) provides that a 'controlling person' is liable 'unless [he/she/it] acted in
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation or cause of action.'" Id. (bracketed text in original).
101. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (noting that
Second Circuit has not ruled whether Section 20(a) has scienter element). See
generally Levine & Mobargha, supra note 62 (discussing split within Second Circuit
regarding pleading Section 20(a) claims). The authors note that the split within
the Second Circuit has lasted for over a quarter of a century. See id. (same).
102. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (explaining
division and highlighting failed attempts to clarify issue within Second Circuit).
"Nonetheless, after 1980, district courts were divided on whether Section 20(a)
contained an element of scienter .. " Id.; see also Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. CIV.972690-LAP, 1998 WL 651065, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998) (noting divergent
standards being applied to motions to dismiss Section 20(a) claims within Second
Circuit). "Although one would think, and hope, that the standard to be applied in
a motion to dismiss a [S]ection 20(a) claim is well-established, the opposite is all
too unfortunately the case." Id. at *22; see also, e.g., In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig.,
186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (representing Second Circuit holdings
addressing issue whether plaintiffs must plead culpable participation when alleging Section 20(a) claims); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 741, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Fin.,
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 407, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); In re Twinlab Corp. Sec.
Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 193, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); In re Livent Inc. Sec. Litig.,
78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Ellison v. Am. Image Motor
Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at
*24 (same); O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179,
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reflects the deep division among the various circuits, as discussed
3

above. 10

In one line of cases, district courts have held that the plaintiff must
plead a violation by the controlled person, control over such person and
culpable participation in the fraud alleged in order to satisfy the requirements under Section 20(a). 10 4 More succinctly, this line of cases, relying
on the holding in Lanza, requires that the plaintiff plead culpability in10 5
stead of placing this burden on the defendant as an affirmative defense.
Courts have subjected Lanza and its progeny to various interpretations;
however, as recently as September 2003, the Eastern District of New York
10 6
used the three-prong test, evidencing the test's continued vitality.
A separate line of cases within the Second Circuit upholds the majority rule, requiring only that the plaintiff plead an allegation of control and
an underlying violation. 10 7 This line of cases, adopting the majority's twopart test and the holding in Marbury Management v. Kohn, 10 8 is relied on
by, and consistent with, the holding in IPO Litigation.'0 9 As with the minority analysis, the key issue is whether the plaintiff or the defendant,
through the exculpatory clause within Section 20(a), has the burden of
1194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same). See generally In re Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
970 F. Supp. 192, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (providing extensive discussion on split
within Second Circuit).
103. For a further discussion on the division between the federal circuit
courts, see supra notes 59-100.
104. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining intent of Congress in adopting Section 20(a)); see also Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d
1080, 1085 (2d Cir. 1974) (same).
The intent of Congress in adding [Section 20], passed at the same time as
the amendment to Section 15 of the 1933 Act, was obviously to impose
liability only on those directors who fall within its definition of control
and who are in some meaningful sense culpable participants in the fraud
perpetrated by controlled persons.
Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1299. But see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw § 14.9 (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that Lanza did
not create three-prong test for plaintiff). The authors interpret the holding in
Lanza as simply recognizing the good faith exception contained in Section 20(a),
placing the burden on the defendant and not the plaintiff to demonstrate the
requisite level of culpability. See id. ("[C]ontrol . . . can be imposed only if the
controlling person had the appropriate degree of culpability.").
105. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1470 (outlining case law following
Lanza).
106. Compare In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393-95
(criticizing holding in Lanza and its progeny), with In re MSC Indus. Direct Co.,
283 F. Supp. 2d 838, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (examining Lanza and upholding majority and minority viewpoints, respectively).
107. See Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *22-24 (examining division within Second Circuit). The judge noted that he agreed with the reasoning of those courts
following Marbury; however, the court in Mishkin required the plaintiff to plead
particularized facts demonstrating culpable participation in the alleged violation.
See id. at *25 (explaining court's holding).
108. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
109. 241 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (describing holding in Marbury).
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showing culpability. 110 The cases following Marbury Management hold that
the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading control and an underlying violation, while the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating lack of involvement or good faith. 111
4.

Post-PSLRA Controversy Within the Second Circuit

In addition to divisions regarding the inclusion of a culpable participation requirement, the courts have inconsistently applied the PSLRA to
Section 20(a) claims. 112 Despite the existence of post-PSLRA decisions
addressing controlling person liability, no clear standard has emerged
with respect to the pleading requirements. 11 3 The one consistency found
regarding the application of the PSLRA appears to be that it is governed
by whether the three-prong or two-prong test is applied.1 1 4 Among those
district courts within the Second Circuit applying the minority's threeprong test-following the adoption of the PSLRA-most have required
some form of heightened pleading standard consistent with Paragraph
1 15
(b)(2) of the PSLRA.
110. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1468-70 (outlining importance of
interpretation of good faith provision contained in Section 20(a)).
111. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (describing
method by which defendant, using good faith provision, may avoid liability).
112. Compare Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *21 (relying on holding in First
Jersey to support application of PSLRA to Section 20(a) claims), with In re Initial
Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396-97 (failing to apply PSLRA to Section
20(a) claims).
113. See Levine & Mobargha, supra note 62 (describing Second Circuit case
law dealing with pleading requirements following PSLRA). Each of the three cases
mentioned by the authors held that culpability is part of establishing a prima facie
case; however, none of the cases (1) acknowledged a split among the district
courts, (2) provided substantive analysis of Section 20(a) or the relevant pleading
requirements or (3) discussed the PSLRA's effect on pleading Section 20(a)
claims. See id. (explaining Second Circuit case law). Arguably, these issues are not
addressed because the court addressed them in FirstJersey. See id. (same); see also,
e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co, 228 F.3d 154, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2000) (representing
post-PSLRA holdings in Second Circuit cases); Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d
715, 721 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). Despite the arguments raised in In re InitialPublic
Offering SecuritiesLitigation,an examination of the cases seems to result in establishment of the minority rule. See Levine & Mobargha, supra note 62 (explaining Second Circuit case law).
114. Compare In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 298 (denying motion to dismiss on grounds that PSLRA does not apply to Section 20(a)
claims and plaintiffs met pleading requirements), with SEC v. FirstJersey Sec., Inc.,
101 F.3d 1450, 1472-73 (2d Cir. 1996) (demonstrating importance of applying
PSLRA by showing alternate result when it is deemed applicable by court).
115. See, e.g., In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d
741 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (requiring heightened pleading standards in allegations
raised under Section 20(a)). See generally Daniel S. Boyce, Note, Pleading Scienter
Under the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Legislative Attempt at Putting
Teeth into the Required State of Mind, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 761 (2001) (describing
heightened pleading requirements applied following passage of PSLRA); Lockhart, supra note 15, § 5, at 210 (analyzing application of culpable participation and
competing standards for assessing controlling person liability).
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In SEC v. FirstJersey Securities, Inc.,' 1 6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit had an opportunity to reconcile the split among district
courts within its own circuit regarding the pleading requirements under
Section 20(a). 117 Coming one year after the enactment of the PSLRA,
some have criticized FirstJersey for its lack of guidance on the issue.' 18 In
addition, subsequent opinions have applied First Jersey's holding narrowly. 119 Instead of establishing a clear standard, this case only added
1 20
"fuel to the debate."
In FirstJersey, the Second Circuit heard appeals from a district court
order following an enforcement action by the SEC against a brokerdealer-First Jersey Securities-and its principal. 121 In addressing the defendants' appeal, the court of appeals upheld the minority's three-prong
test. 1 22 Despite this pronouncement, the court's reliance on divergent
cases from the district courts, which both include and exclude culpable
116. 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996).
117. See id. at 1472-75 (discussing legal inquiry regarding controlling person
liability under Section 20(a)); see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 60, at 24
(analyzing Second Circuit holdings and trends within Circuit).
118. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (noting
shortfalls of holding in FirstJersey). The court noted that the holding in FirstJersey
never "even hinted that scienter must be pled in a Section 20(a) claim in accordance with paragraph (b) (2)." Id. (holding that culpable participation is not same
as scienter).
119. See id. (noting that several district courts revisited Section 20(a) following FirstJersey but failed to define culpable participation). But see Boguslavsky v.
Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 720 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying on FirstJersey's three-prong test
for prima facie case). Although the court in Boguslavsky did not define culpable
participation, the court clearly supported the holding in FirstJersey, requiring three
elements for the establishment of a prima facie case under Section 20(a). See id.
(representing post-PSLRA cases in Second Circuit).
120. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1471 (describing shortcomings of
holding in FirstJersey) (quoting In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F.
Supp. 2d 371, 415 (S.D.N.Y 2001)).
121. See FirstJersey, 101 F.3d at 1456-62 (summarizing procedural history and
facts underlying case). The district court held defendants liable for federal securities law violations, and the defendants appealed. See id. at 1462 (outlining procedural history of case). On appeal, the court held, inter alia, that the principal,
Robert E. Brennan, was liable as a controlling person. See id. (affirming district
court's decision).
122. See id. at 1472-73 (including "culpable participation" as one of three
parts required for prima facie case). "[A] plaintiff must show a primary violation
by the controlled person and control of the primary violator by the targeted defendant and show that the controlling person was 'in some meaningful sense a culpable participant in the fraud perpetrated by [the] controlled person.'" Id. at 1472.
But see In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (interpreting First
Jersey as requiring only allegations of control and underlying violation at pleading
stage). The court in In re InitialPublic Offering Securities Litigation viewed the inclusion of the third prong of the prima facie test as only a part of the good faith
defense afforded to the defendant and not a required element of pleading for the
plaintiff. See id. at 394-95 (same).
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participation, resulted in ambiguity. 123 Specifically, critics of the holding
in FirstJersey argue that the court's reliance on Marbury Management and
Gordon was contradictory because those cases support the majority view
and the minority view, respectively. 124 Further, because FirstJersey was not
a pleading case, the opinion has limited acceptance and varied interpretations. 125 Many subsequent opinions have relied on the holding in First
Jersey; however, the omissions in the opinion with respect to the PSLRA
126
and the culpable participation doctrine have resulted in confusion.
One attempt at clarifying any apparent uncertainty resulting from the
holding in FirstJersey came from the Southern District of New York in
1998.127 The court in Mishkin v. Agelofj 28 analyzed the interaction between the PSLRA and Section 20(a), overruling a prior holding in what
could be viewed as a precursor to IPO Litigation.12 9 Strangely, the Southern District of New York performed an almost identical legal analysis in
123. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (discussing
FirstJersey's reliance on contradictory cases).
124. See id. (analyzing Second Circuit's establishment of three-part test for
proving Section 20(a) claims). In establishing the first two prongs of the test-(1)
a primary violation by the controlled person and (2) control of the primary violator-the court cited Marbuiy, a case widely cited for the proposition that culpable
participation is not required in establishing a Section 20(a) claim. See id. at 394
(outlining elements of test). The court went further and included a third prong,
requiring a showing that the controlling person was in some meaningful sense a
culpable participant in the fraud committed. See id. (citing Gordon v. Burr, 506
F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277,
1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc))) (explaining third prong of test).
125. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (refusing to
interpret FirstJersey as definitively establishing three-prong test at pleading stage);
see also Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. CIV.97-2690-LAP, 1998 WL 651065, at *23 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 1998) (noting hesitancy to conclude FirstJersey resolved critical pleading
dispute because it was not "a pleading case"). "Although the court does indeed
refer to the elements of a 'prima facie' case, FirstJersey was not a pleading case-it
was an appeal from a final judgment after a bench trial." Id. The court in Mishkin
went further, noting that FirstJerseydid not mention any of the district court cases
addressing the pleading requirements issue. See id. (distinguishing FirstJersey). But
see Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Fin., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 407, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (interpreting First Jersey's prima facie requirements as pleading
requirements).
126. See FirstJersey, 101 F.3d at 1472-74 (omitting creation of pleading standard and definition of culpable participation); see also, e.g., Suez Equity Investors v.
Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87,101-02 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on holding
in FirstJersey but allowing lesser standard of culpability to suffice in pleadings).
The court analyzed the complaint and held that the role of the defendant as an
officer of a bank, with primary responsibility for .the dealings of the bank, was
sufficient to plead controlling person liability for the bank. See id. (same); see also
BLOOMENTHAL, supranote 14, at 1472 (analyzing confusion with regard to culpability requirement following FirstJersey).
127. See Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *22-26 (holding that Paragraph (b) (2)
of PSLRA applies to Section 20(a)).
128. No. CIV.97-2690-LAP, 1998 WL 651065 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998).
129. See id. at *23 (interpreting Paragraph (b) (2) as applying in situations in
which plaintiff must ultimately prove defendant's state of mind); see also Duncan v.
Pencer, No. CIV.94-0321-LAP, 1996 WL 19043, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1996)
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Mishkin and achieved the opposite result from the one reached in IPO
Litigation.130 The holding in Mishkin provides important guidance concerning application of the PSLRA to Section 20(a) claims. 13 1 This case
came three years after the enactment of the PSLRA and therefore addressed the controversial interaction between Section 20(a) and the
heightened pleading requirements set forth in Paragraph (b) (2) of the
l3 2
PSLRA.
In GabrielCapital,L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc.,133 the Southern District
of New York followed the Second Circuit's holding in FirstJersey.'3 4 The
confusion surrounding two critical issues, namely the requirement that a
plaintiff prove that the controlling person was a culpable participant in
the underlying violation and that the heightened pleading requirements
13 5
of the PSLRA apply to Section 20(a) claims, appeared to be resolved.
Despite providing additional support for the holding in First Jersey, the
court left uncertainty regarding whether or not culpable participation
should be equated with scienter.13 6 The precise standard to be applied in
order for the plaintiffs burden to be met was debated by the court; how137
ever, the PSLRA was applied to the Section 20(a) claims.
Less than two years before the holding in IPO Litigation,the Southern
District of New York renewed its support for the three-prong test in In re
(holding that plaintiff must only allege control and underlying violation in Section
20(a) claims).
130. Compare Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *22-26 (engaging in almost identical legal analysis and reaching contradictory conclusion), with In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393-97 (same).
131. See Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *23 (addressing PSLRA's interaction
with Section 20(a)).
132. See id. at *22-26 (same).
133. 122 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
134. See id. at 426-27 (relying on holding in FirstJerseyto determine whether
plaintiffs had met burden to survive motion to dismiss); see also Boguslavsky v.
Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 720 (2d Cir. 1998) (establishing three-part test relied on in
Gabriel).
135. See Gabriel, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (adopting culpable participation standard and applying PSLRA's heightened pleading standards to Section 20(a)
claims). Although the court noted that "the meaning of the third element-culpable participation"-was "less than clear," the court went on to hold that the culpable participation element "requires plaintiffs to prove the controlling person's
state of mind" and "is subject to the PSLRA's heightened pleading standards." Id.
136. See id. at 427-29 (analyzing what plaintiffs must allege in order to satisfy
culpable participation and heightened pleading standards of PSLRA). Following
the court's reasoning that the PSLRA applied to the Section 20(a) claims, the
court turned to "the more difficult question" of "what plaintiffs must allege in
order to satisfy th[eir] burden." Id. at 427. "Attempting to divine the distinctions
between a 'strong inference,' 'strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior,' and being 'in some meaningful sense [a] culpable participant,' is . . . 'an
inquiry in the class of angelic terpsichore on heads of pins."' Id. at 427-28 (citation
omitted).
137. See id. at 427 (requiring application of PSLRA and noting confusion with
respect to standard subsequently required).
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Independent Energy Holdings PLC Securities Litigation.13 8 In the opinion by
Judge Scheindlin-author of the !PO Litigationopinion-the court noted
that the Second Circuit has "not yet addressed the meaning of 'culpable
participation'"; however, the court relied on the inclusion of culpable participation in Section 20(a) claims in order to apply the heightened pleading requirements set forth under the PSLRA.139 Following the court's
decision to subject the plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claims to the requirements
of the PSLRA, the allegations were dismissed, further evidencing the im140
portance of the application of the PSLRA.
More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York addressed the application of the PSLRA to Section 20(a) in a
response to a motion by defendants pursuant to Section 12(b) (6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.14 1 In In re Deutsche Telekom AG Securities
Litigation,14 2 the court dismissed plaintiffs' Section 20(a) allegations
against one of the named defendants. 143 The court held that the plaintiffs
failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that the particular defendant was a controlling person with culpable participation within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 144 Significantly, the court
adopted the minority's three-prong test. 145 Further, the court relied on
138. See In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 741,
769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (establishing three-part test required for Section 20(a)
claims); see also id. at 770 (comparing and contrasting requirements for claims
brought under Section 15 of Securities Act and Section 20(a) of Exchange Act).
"The law is less clear, however, as to the requirements of a prima facie case under
[S]ection 15." Id.
139. Id. at 771 (describing culpable participation requirement contained in
Section 20(a)). "Because the culpable participation element requires plaintiffs to
prove the controlling person's state of mind, the PSLRA's heightened pleading
requirements apply." Id.
140. See id. at 772 (describing dismissal of Section 20(a) allegations based on
failure to state particularized facts, consistent with culpable participation requirement and minority view).
141. See In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., No. CIV.00-9475-SHS, 2002
WL 244597, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (describing procedural history of
case). Rule 12(b)(6) states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted
in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ...
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b) (6); see also In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., 2002 WL
244597, at *7 (describing controversy surrounding requirements for prima facie
case pursuant to Section 20(a)).
142. No. CIV.00-9475-SHS, 2002 WL 244597 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002).
143. See id. at *1 (describing holding of court regarding motion to dismiss
and dismissing allegations against Dreditanstalt fur Weideraufbau).
144. See id. (outlining reasoning underlying court's holding); see also id. at *6
(discussing reasoning in greater detail).
145. See id. at *6 (describing requirements for prima facie case).
In order to establish a prima facie case of control person liability pursuant to Section 20(a), however, three elements are required: (1) an under-
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Paragraph (b) (2) of the PSLRA in holding that a strong inference of culpable participation is required in pleading Section 20(a) claims. 14 6 Elaborating on its reasoning for applying the PSLRA to the plaintiffs' Section
20(a) allegations, the court described various standards set forth by the
district courts within the Second Circuit and then established its own standard. 14 7 Irrespective of the 'various standards sufficient to satisfy the culpable participation element of Section 20(a), the court expressly required
application of the PSLRA in pleading Section 20(a) violations. 148 Preceding IPO Litigation by only one year and one day, the holding in Deutsche
Telekom provides a stark contrast to IPO Litigation in its dismissal of plaintiffs' Section 20(a) allegations for a failure to meet the pleading require1 49
ments set forth under the PSLRA.
III.
A.

THE CASE

Facts of IPO Litigation

IPO Litigation specifically addressed the issues causing deep division
among the circuits and district courts within the Second Circuit regarding
lying primary violation of the securities laws by the controlled person; (2)
control over the controlled person; and (3) that the controlling person
was, in some meaningful sense, a culpable participant in the controlled
person's primary violation.
Id.
146. See id. (explaining required application of PSLRA to Section 20(a)
claims). "Culpable participation must be pled to allege control person liability
pursuant to Section 20(a) as a consequence of the pleading requirements of the
PSLRA ...." Id.
147. See id. at *7 (outlining three standards for satisfaction of culpable participation element of Section 20(a)).
The [district courts within the Second Circuit] have held variously that
the culpable participation element of section 20(a) requires the pleading
of: (1) "particularized facts of the controlling person's conscious misbehavior as a culpable participant in the fraud"... ; (2) "facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the controlling person knew or should have
known that the primary violator, over whom the person had control, was
engaging in fraudulent conduct" ... and; (3) "either conscious misbehavior or recklessness .
Id. (citations omitted). The court stated that the requirements of the PSLRA
would be met "where facts are pled with sufficient particularity that a strong inference is raised that the section 20(a) control person knew or should have known
that the controlled person was engaging in fraudulent conduct." See id. (adopting
standard established in Gabriel Capital,L.P. v. NatWest Financial,Inc., 122 F. Supp.
2d 407, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
148. See id. (noting intra-circuit split regarding pleading specifics of Section
20(a) and applying heightened pleading requirements of PSLRA).
149. Compare In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 393-97
(highlighting contradictory holding with respect to defendants' motions to dismiss
Section 20(a) claims for failure to meet requirements under PSLRA), with In re
Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 244597, at *7 (same).
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the pleading standard under Section 20(a) and the PSLRA. 150 In this
case, investors brought suits against underwriters of IPOs, issuers of securities and officers of the issuers, alleging named defendants participated in
a fraudulent scheme to drive up the price of stock of companies in the
immediate aftermarket of their IPOs. 1 5 1 The schemes alleged in the
plaintiffs' complaint received widespread exposure, even prompting clarifying comments from the Division of Market Regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, following the IPO hot issue markets of 1998
to 2000.152
Although the plaintiffs involved in the class action suit alleged a wide
range of securities laws violations, this Note focuses on the allegations that
the individual defendants violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act because they "controlled" the Issuers' 5 3 at the time of the alleged securities
150. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 392-97 (addressing Section 20(a) claims raised by plaintiffs' and defendants' arguments on motion
to dismiss); see also id. at 295-98 (summarizing holdings of case).
151. See Glasner, supra note 1 (describing involvement of start-up companies
and key financial institutions in case). "The roster of companies currently targeted
in class actions reads like a veritable Who's Who list of the IPO boom ... as well as
Wall Street's most powerful investment banks." Id.; see also In re InitialPub. Offering
Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 293-95 (introducing case and providing historical
context and procedural history). See generally Big IPO, supra note 2 (providing statistical data on IPO pricing during hot issue markets).
152. See Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, Trying to Avoid the Flippers,WALL ST.
J., Dec. 6, 2000, at Al (describing practice of laddering, tie-in agreements and
flipping during IPOs); see also Division of Market Regulation, SEC, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 10: Prohibited Solicitations and "Tie-in" Agreements for Aftermarket Purchases
(Aug. 25, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbmrl0.htm (restating position regarding "tie-in" agreements and aftermarket purchases). The
Division of Market Regulation states:
Recently, the Division has become aware of complaints that, while participating in a distribution of securities, underwriters and broker-dealers
have solicited their customers to make additional purchases of the offered security after trading in the security begins. Moreover, some underwriters have required their customers to agree to buy additional shares in
the aftermarket as a condition to being allocated shares in the distribution (i.e. "tie-in" agreements). These practices are prohibited by Rules
101 and 102 of Regulation M,. . . and may violate other anti-fraud and
anti-manipulation provisions of the federal securities laws.
Id. (internal citation omitted). See generally Christopher H. Schmitt, How Wall Street
Can Give Everybody a Chance, Bus. WK. ONLINE (June 18, 2001), at http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_25/b3737102.htm
(describing restrictive effects of U.S. securities market in context of allocating IPOs). The author noted that more than 2,800 companies raised more than $270 billion during
the IPO boom; however, "[i]nsiders reaped much of the profits, and individual
investors were too often locked out." Id. (noting disproportionate benefit to
insiders).
153. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 294 ("In total,
Plaintiffs are suing fifty-five [u]nderwriters, 309 [i]ssuers, and thousands of
[i]ndividual [d]efendants."); see also id. at 416-21 (providing detailed list of cases
consolidated as In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation).
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violation. 15 4 The inclusion of Section 20(a) allegations by the plaintiffs
was an attempt to expand liability for the named defendants by including
not only the defendants' own alleged misconduct but also the alleged mis155
conduct of the companies they "controlled."
The individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the Section 20(a) claims the plaintiffs made failed to meet the pleading requirements set forth under the PSLRA. 156 Specifically, the Issuers argued in
their motion to dismiss that the plaintiffs' allegations were deficient because they did not demonstrate "culpable participation" by the defendants
in the alleged fraud. 15 7 The strength of the defendants' argument, therefore, rested on the court's adoption of the minority or majority interpretation of Section 20(a). 158
B.

NarrativeAnalysis

In IPO Litigation, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York considered whether a claim made under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act contains a state of mind, or scienter, requirement. 159 The
court first outlined the history of Section 20(a) jurisprudence, noting the
current state of confusion in the Second Circuit, particularly concerning
motions to dismiss Section 20(a) claims. 160 Next, the court identified the
154. See id. at 392 (noting that every individual defendant accused of violating
Section 20(a) is also accused of primary liability).
155. See id. at 300-10 (detailing allegations against defendants); see, e.g.,
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1975) (describing efforts
taken to sue both corporation and president of corporation).
156. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (noting
defendants' argument that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead elements of control
and culpable participation).
157. See Issuers' Motion to Dismiss at 63-65, In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec.
Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 21 MC 92), at http://
www.iposecuritieslitigation.com/Iss-motiondis.pdf (outlining grounds upon
which issuer defendants sought grant of motion to dismiss Section 20(a) claims).
Relying on In re Deutsche Telekom AG SecuritiesLitigation, No. CIV.00-9475-SHS, 2002
WL 244597 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002), the issuer defendants argued that the claims
alleging Section 20(a) violations must demonstrate "culpable participation," and
this may be satisfied by pleading either " (1) particularized facts of the controlling
person's conscious behavior as a culpable participant in the fraud; [or] (2) facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the controlling person knew or should have
known that the primary violator, over whom the person had control, was engaging
in fraudulent conduct." Id. (defining requirements of culpable participation).
158. See id. at 60-61 (setting forth defendants' argument regarding plaintiffs'
failure to meet heightened pleading requirement).
159. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94 (setting
forth legal inquiry involved in Section 20(a) allegations).
160. See id. (describing historical roots of Section 20(a), relevant case law and
intra-circuit split); see also Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. CIV.97-2690-LAP, 1998 WL
651065, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998) (noting that standard to be applied to
motion to dismiss Section 20(a) claim is not well established).
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applicable securities law framework. 16 1 Finally, the court addressed each
of the claims asserted by the individual defendants in their motions to
dismiss the Section 20(a) allegations. 16 2 Most importantly, the court acknowledged that the key legal issue with respect to the Section 20(a)
163
claims was the interpretation of the phrase "culpable participation."
The court first reviewed the applicable case law regarding Section
20(a) and the inclusion or exclusion of a state of mind requirement at the
pleading stage. 16 4 At the outset, the court recognized the holding in First
165
Jersey, but the court emphasized that FirstJersey was not a pleading case.
The court's treatment of FirstJersey is of particular interest because the
Second Circuit expressly stated the three requirements for establishing a
prima facie case of controlling person liability.' 66 The court in IPO Litigation, however, reasoned that the result in First Jersey was internally
167
inconsistent.
161. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 392-94 (detailing
relevant legal inquiry in addressing plaintiffs' Section 20(a) allegations).
162. See id. at 392-97 (responding to defendants' claims raised in motion to
dismiss).
163. See id. at 393 (describing focal point of discussion regarding Section
20(a)). "Thus the critical question is what is meant by 'culpable participation'-a
term that does not appear anywhere in Section 20(a)." Id.
164. See id. (noting importance of examining Section 20(a) jurisprudence to
understand current controversy regarding elements of prima facie case).
165. See id. (noting that Second Circuit has held three-prong test is required
to prove Section 20(a) claim).
[T]he Second Circuit has held that in order to prove a Section 20(a)
claim, "a plaintiff must show (1) a primary violation by a controlled person; (2) control of the primary violator by the defendant; and (3) 'that
the controlling person was in some meaningful sense a culpable participant' in the primary violation."
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *23 (noting that
FirstJerseywas not a pleading case). The court in In re InitialPublic Offering Securities
Litigation adopted an approach similar to the one adopted by the court in Mishkin,
i.e., hesitancy to conclude that the holding in FirstJerseyresolved a controversial
intra-circuit dispute. See 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (noting similarities in interpretation of FirstJersey in In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation and Mishkin cases).
166. See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff must make showing, prior to submission of any proof by
defendant, "that the controlling person 'was in some meaningful sense a culpable
participant'"); In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (interpreting FirstJersey differently than many other district courts). "Although many district
courts understood FirstJersey to conclusively require plaintiffs to plead scienter, the
Court of Appeals has revisited Section 20(a) three times since 1996, but never
addressed the meaning of 'culpable participation.'" Id.; see also, e.g., Mishkin, 1998
WL 651065, at *22-24 (holding in favor of three-part test and application of
PSLRA).
167. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (discussing
court's holding in FirstJersey). The inconsistency within the holding in FirstJerseywhich the court in In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation points out-is the
fact that allegations of control combined with an underlying violation appear to
suffice, despite establishment of three-prong test earlier in the court's opinion. See
id. (noting internal inconsistency in FirstJersey and apparent misunderstanding of
holding in subsequent cases). But see Mishkin, 1998 WL 651065, at *24 (interpret-
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The court went on to address the "false dichotomy" existing in the
Second Circuit between the courts following the holding in Lanza and
those adopting the holding in Marbury Management.168 Attempting to explain the foundations for the division within the Second Circuit, the court
noted that those courts following the Lanza holding assumed that culpable
participation meant scienter. 169 In addition, the court provided an analysis of the phrase "culpable participation" in an effort to negate the belief
170
that culpable participation is the same as scienter.
The court further noted that the inclusion of a state of mind requirement at the proving stage had led many courts to compel pleading scienter under Paragraph (b) (2) of the PSLRA. 171 Responding to this
argument, the court noted the lack of precedent holding that provingstate
of mind resulted in mandatory pleadingof state of mind. 172 The court also
noted that a majority of the federal circuit courts have held that the plaintiff is not required to establish culpable participation by the controlling
173
person at the pleading stage.
Finally, the court abrogated its prior decisions in Independent Energy
and Gabriel Capital,holding that controlling person liability under the Exchange Act does not require proof of scienter. 174 The court then held
ing court's holding in FirstJersey). "The critical point is that this language [regarding culpable participation requirement] imposes an initial burden, not just a
burden if the defendant makes a showing of good faith." Id.
168. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (describing
division within Second Circuit over issue of culpable participation); id. at 394
n.182 (providing detailed analysis of misconception resulting in division within
Second Circuit). "This false dichotomy arose because those courts that 'followed'
Lanza and Gordon assumed that 'culpable participation' meant scienter. Why 'culpable participation' was equated with scienter is a mystery that no court in this
circuit has ever explained." Id.
169. See id. at 394 (describing competing interpretations of culpable participation within Second Circuit).
170. See id. (attempting to define culpable participation). The court defined
both "culpable" and "participation" and argued that the term was "more closely
analogous to the (criminal) concept of actus reus, i.e., culpable conduct, than it is
to mens rea, i.e., culpable state of mind." Id.
171. See, e.g., In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 310 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (incorporating PSLRA into Section 20(a) claim); In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 741, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
172. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 394 (explaining
Second Circuit's failure to define application of PSLRA to Section 20(a)). "This
assumption [that plaintiffs must plead scienter under Paragraph (b) (2) of PSLRA]
has been made despite the fact that the Second Circuit has never defined 'culpable
participation' or equated that term with scienter." Id. at 393; see also Mishkin, 1998
WL 651065, at *22 (describing lack of clear standard in addressing motions to

dismiss Section 20(a) claims).
173. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393 n.179 (listing six federal circuit courts making up majority view); see also, e.g., Brown v. Enstar
Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 (11th Cir. 1996) (outlining standard for controlling
person liability under Section 20(a)).
174. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (providing
reasoning for decision to overrule prior precedent). The court stated, "Therefore,
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that the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements do not govern Section 20(a) claims. 175 In abrogating its prior decisions, the court appeared
to rely on a new understanding of the language and intent of Section
20(a), the relevant case law and the relevance of the PSLRA in securities
176
fraud litigation.
C.

CriticalAnalysis

IPO Litigationaddressed the intersection between the PSLRA and Sec-

tion 20(a) in an attempt to clarify the pleading requirements for a Section
20(a) claim.1 7 7 Engaging in this exercise, the court arguably granted individuals seeking restitution from "controlling persons" a large victory. 178
The implication of the court's decision to deny the defendants' motion to
dismiss is the collapse of the culpable participation doctrine and circum179
vention of the PSLRA.
The Southern District of New York's holding placed undue emphasis
on Marbury Management, despite the Second Circuit's holding in First
Jersey.180 The main reason for this appears to be criticism of the holding in
FirstJersey.18 ' The court's first objection to the Second Circuit's holding in
18
First Jersey regarded its lack of a definition for culpable participation.

2

because Plaintiffs have adequately alleged control . . . the Individual Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Section 20(a) claims is denied except as to those Individual
Defendants alleged to have controlled Issuer Defendants previously dismissed
under Rule lOb-5." Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
175. See id. at 396-97 (resting holding on interpretations of legislative history
and Section 20(a) jurisprudential inconsistencies).
176. See id. at 397 n.187 (describing decision to abrogate prior rulings).
Judge Scheindlin quoted Justice Frankfurter: "Wisdom too often never comes, and
so one ought not reject it merely because it comes late." Id. (quoting Henslee v.
Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
177. See id. at 393-96 (addressing applicability of PSLRA to Section 20(a)
claim); see also Rice, supra note 53, at 290-91 (providing detailed analysis regarding
application of PSLRA). "The courts will now have to decide whether the PSLRA
has changed either the meaning of good faith or the burden of proof because the
statute does not address either issue squarely." Id.
178. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393-97 (setting
forth holding with regard to Section 20(a) claims). The ease with which plaintiffs
can allege Section 20(a) claims is greatly increased because the PSLRA is deemed
inapplicable to Section 20(a). See id. at 396 (holding PSLRA inapplicable to Section 20(a) claims). The impact is immediately apparent. See id. at 393-97 (describing effect of PSLRA on Section 20(a) claims).
179. See id. at 393-94 (analyzing and criticizing application of culpable participation doctrine and PSLRA scienter requirements to Section 20(a) claims).
180. See id. (discussing Second Circuit's holdings in Marbury Management and
Boguslavsky). Strangely, the court placed greater emphasis on the older of the two
cases in this context. See id. (same).
181. See id. at 393-97 (emphasizing deficiencies of Second Circuit's decision in

FirstJersey).
182. See id. at 395 (noting cases subsequent to FirstJersey that, like their predecessor, failed to define culpable participation).
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Further, the court in IPO Litigation highlighted the procedural posture in
FirstJersey.18 3 The court argued that the Second Circuit would have been
more explicit in the event its holding in FirstJersey was meant to resolve the
long-standing controversy surrounding pleading requirements under Sec84
tion 20(a).1
The merits of the court's reasoning are based largely on its interpretation of the intent underlying Section 20(a).18 5 Drawing support from
opinions in other circuits, the court noted that the statute does not appear
to require actual participation in the alleged violation in order to establish
liability.18 6 Further, the court stressed its belief that the courts supporting
the minority view misinterpret the legislative history underlying Section
20(a). 18 7 In addition, the court emphasized that the Exchange Act's purpose was to achieve a high standard of ethical behavior and to provide the
188
public with a remedy for violations.
183. See id. (discussing procedural posture of FirstJersey).
184. See id. (same). See generally Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. CIV.97-2690-LAP,
1998 WL 651065, at *13-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998) (recognizing importance of
procedural posture in FirstJersey but declining to make posture dispositive issue).
For a further discussion of the procedural posture of FirstJersey, see supra notes
121-26 and accompanying text.
185. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96 (describing remedial purpose of statute); see also Secondary Liability, supra note 33, at 1348
(describing intent of controlling person provision as allocating liability with business relationships in mind). The author argued that "the consequences of liability
do not attach because of mere structural or organizational domination: controlling
persons with an apparent connection to a violation may avoid liability in particular
cases on the grounds of good faith or lack of knowledge or involvement." Id.
186. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir.
1981) (explaining that Fifth Circuit case law follows plain meaning of statute).
The Fifth Circuit does not interpret the language of Section 20(a) to require culpable participation. See id. (describing court's argument against requiring culpable participation in connection with Section 20(a) claims).
187. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (arguing
that Lanza and its progeny misinterpret legislative history of Section 20(a)); see also
Kuehnle, supranote 34, at 363-64 (highlighting misguided interpretations by court
in Lanza). The court in Lanza refers to an amendment by Senator Fletcher; however, this amendment was rejected by Congress and a wholly different standard was
chosen. See id. at 363 ("The standard that was adopted makes no reference to the
exercise of control, but instead refers only to knowledge ... ."). The author argues that "[t] he rejection of the Fletcher amendment only can be interpreted as a
rejection of a participation requirement, rather than as support for such a requirement." Id.
188. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 293-94 (providing historical background and emphasizing previous fraudulent behavior); see also
Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 414 U.S. 926, 929 (1973) (Douglas, J.,dissenting)
(describing original intent of Exchange Act and Section 20(a)).
Section 20(a) provides that anyone who "controls" a person liable under
the 1934 Act is equally liable, subject only to the defense of "goodfaith." The
section "is remedial and is to be construed liberally. It has been interpreted as requiring only some indirect means of discipline or influence
short of actual direction to hold a 'controlling person' liable." . . . The
purpose of the Act is to expand, not restrict, the public's remedies.
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The court's analysis regarding Section 20(a)-arguing in favor of a
bifurcated construction created by the inclusion of the good faith defense
in Section 20(a) and placing emphasis on the legislative intent underlying
Section 20(a)-was arguably weakened by the court's strict interpretation
of Paragraph (b) (2) of the PSLRA. 18 9 The court examined the specific
language of Paragraph (b) (2) in order to support its holding that the
PSLRA does not apply to Section 20(a) claims.' 9 0 The court drew a crucial distinction with respect to Section 20(a) in order to corroborate its
holding. 191 First, the court established that Paragraph (b) (2) applies to
private actions in which the plaintiff may recover daimages only on proof
of the defendant's state of mind.1 9 2 Next, the court emphasized (1) the
exclusion of culpability as a requirement for the plaintiffs establishment of
a prima facie case and (2) the defendant's affirmative defense contained
1 93
in the good faith provision of Section 20(a).
The court applied these factors to demonstrate that a plaintiff could
recover damages without proving the defendant's state of mind. 194 In creating this example, the court created a hypothetical previously addressed
in Mishkin.19 5 In the court's hypothetical, the premise upon which it circumvented application of the PSLRA, the plaintiff is in a "control" relaId. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (describing importance of upholding ethical standards in business). "'It requires but little appreciation .

.

. of what hap-

pened in this country during the 1920's and 1930's to realize how essential it is that
the highest ethical standards prevail' in every facet of the securities industry." Id.
189. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (relying
heavily on creation of hypothetical situation resulting in circumvention of PSLRA).
In particular, the court's failure to acknowledge the likelihood that a controlling
person defendant would raise the affirmative defense in future Section 20(a) cases
exposed the holding to potential criticism. See id. (noting that plaintiff need only
prove scienter if good faith affirmative defense is raised).
190. See id. (emphasizing word "only" in Paragraph (b) (2)). The court noted
that a plaintiff may recover without proving that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. See id. (noting burden of proof shifts to plaintiff only if defendant presents good faith affirmative defense).
191. See id. at 396 ("Neither the PSLRA (because scienter is not an essential
element), nor Rule 9(b) (because fraud is not an essential element), apply to a
Section 20(a) claim.").
192. See id. at 359 (analyzing PSLRA and heightened pleading requirements
set forth in Paragraph (b) (2)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (2000) (setting
forth Paragraph (b) (2) of PSLRA).
193. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (noting that
plaintiff is only required to show state of mind if defendant raises affirmative defense). This analysis highlights the crucial role that the minority's state of mind
requirement plays in addressing the application of the PSLRA to Section 20(a).
See id. (same).
194. See id. (creating hypothetical situation regarding affirmative defense and
culpability requirement).
195. See Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. CIV.97-2690-LAP, 1998 WL 651065, at *24
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998) (outlining argument that plaintiff in controlling person
liability suit can recover damages on something other than proof of defendant's
state of mind). The court in Mishkin stated:
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tionship and there is an underlying violation, but the controlling person
defendant does not apply the exculpatory clause in Section 20(a). 1 96 The
court held that, because of the existence of this possibility, the heightened
1 97
pleading requirements should not apply to Section 20(a) claims.
The circumvention of the PSLRA may be on tenuous grounds because the Second Circuit-in FirstJerse--- appeared to hold that a state of
mind element is required in proving a Section 20(a) claim. 198 Irrespective
of this fact, the foundation for the holding that the PSLRA does not apply
to Section 20(a) clai ms is grounded in the premise that the plaintiff can
recover damages without a showing of the controlling person's state of
mind. 19 9 The court's contradictory conclusions demonstrate the significance of determining whether Section 20(a) claims contain a scienter element.20 0 In the event Section 20(a) is not found to contain a state of
mind requirement at the pleading stage, it is unlikely that the PSLRA will
20 1
be applied.
In other words, "proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of
mind" is only necessary if the defendant comes forward with proof that he
acted in good faith, and because not all defendants will do that, section
20(a) claims do not necessarily require proof that a defendant acted
"with a particular state of mind."
Id.
196. See id. (indicating not all defendants will be able to assert that they acted
in good faith).
197. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (noting that
plaintiff need only prove scienter following affirmative defense by defendant,
thereby eliminating requirements under PSLRA). But see Mishkin, 1998 WL
651065, at *24 (holding that Paragraph (b) (2) applies to Section 20(a)).
198. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (comparing
Second Circuit's ambiguity regarding pleading requirements with its definitiveness
regarding elements required to prove controlling person liability); see also Slack &
Thada, supranote 15, at 5 ("The Second Circuit will also have to address the arguable inconsistencies between the decisions in InitialPublic Offering and ... the Second Circuit's decisions in Lanza and FirstJersey.").
199. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (noting that
state of mind is only required if affirmative defense raised).
200. Compare id. at 396-97 (noting that scienter is not essential element of
Section 20(a) claim), with In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 741, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting alternative requirements for establishment of prima facie case for Section 20(a) claim).
201. Compare In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (highlighting importance of culpable state of mind requirement in applying PSLRA),
with In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 771-72 (same).
Put simply, requiring the plaintiff to prove "state of mind" appears to compel application of the PSLRA. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at
396 (noting that culpable participation element requires plaintiff to prove controlling person's state of mind). Therefore, an effective way to circumvent the PSLRA
is to eliminate this requirement. See id. (noting that state of mind component
requires application of PSLRA's heightened pleading standard); see also Gabriel
Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Fin., Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 407, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (requiring plaintiff to prove state of mind).
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IV.

IMPACT

20 2
"[C]urrent policy is invariably designed to prevent the last crisis."

Examining the court's opinion and its extensive discussion on the offensiveness of the fraud alleged by the plaintiffs, the historical context of
the case likely played a key role in the holding. 20 3 Moreover, in deciding
to allow Section 20(a) allegations to circumvent the PSLRA, the holding
arguably reflects the difference in the economic atmosphere in the United
States today, as compared with the one present in 1995.204 The logical
concern regarding this potential shift in attitude towards the heightened
pleading requirements set forth under the PSLRA is whether the pendu20 5
lum will swing back too far.
202. Buckberg et al., supra note 54, at 13 (suggesting impact of SarbanesOxley may be secondary).
203. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 293-95 (providing background on alleged scheme and noting scheme offends very purpose of
securities laws); see also id. at 300-08 (detailing history of hot issue markets). The
court's detailed historical analysis on past hot issue markets is undoubtedly an attempt to show the importance of class action litigation in preventing future fraudulent practices and abuses of the securities markets. See generally Was IPO Frenzy
Rigged?, supra note 4 (providing description of injured investor during IPO boom
and bust). Many magazine articles-the same magazines formerly describing the
dream of early retirement-focus on starting retirement plans from scratch. See
Jane Bryant Quinn, Rethink Your 401(K)-Now; Your Stock-Bubble Money Is Gone,
NEWSWEEK, July 23, 2001 (exposing rising fears regarding retirement as investors
watched portfolios fall dramatically).
204. Compare Pritchard, supra note 55, at 2 (describing impact recent corporate scandals have had on PSLRA and attitudes towards accountants, investment
bankers and high-tech entrepreneurs), with Avery, supra note 42, at 337-41 (exposing shift in attitudes from 1995 to 2003). The strength of the accounting and
banking industry lobbyists in 1995 was largely responsible for the success of the
PSLRA. See Avery, supra note 42, at 339 (noting that accounting industry complained of litigation explosion). The voices being heard following the spate of
corporate scandals today, however, are those of the shareholders calling for
amendment or even repeal of the PSLRA. See Pritchard, supra note 55, at 2
(describing attitudes in Congress in order to highlight differences between 1998
and today). "Congress-always attuned to the anguish of angry investors-is a
much less hospitable place for accountants, investment bankers, and high tech
entrepreneurs than it was a few years ago." Id. But see In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec.
Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (relying on interpretation of Section 20(a) and language of PSLRA in reaching holding). The court rested its holding on a renewed
interpretation of the applicable legislative history and arguably was not influenced
by historical context. See id. at 396 n.185 (analyzing legislative history of PSLRA).
Further, the court analyzed Section 20(a) jurisprudence, and the inherent conflicts therein, to reach a conclusion contradictory to that in In re Independent Energy
Holdings PLC Securities Litigation. See id. at 396 (holding scienter is not essential
element in Section 20(a) claims).
205. See Buckberg et al., supra note 54, at 1 (describing plaintiffs' attorneys
targeting of PSLRA following recent corporate scandals). While the atmosphere is
favorable to the plaintiffs' bar, attacks have been launched against the PSLRA. See
id. (indicating some commentators argued that PSLRA reduced corporate
accountability).
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Leaving the contextual policy concerns aside, the Southern District of
New York's ruling has the potential to change securities litigation significandy. 20 6 Section 20(a) claims, in the event the PSLRA is deemed inapplicable to that section of the Exchange Act, will gain breadth, and therefore
strength, because the requirements for stating a claim for controlling person liability will be lowered. 20 7 Further, this reduction in the scope of the
PSLRA may result in widespread efforts to expose broad groups of individuals to liability in lawsuits commenced under the Exchange Act. 20 8 Proponents of the holding in IPO Litigationhave strong arguments, grounded in
the legislative history of Section 20(a) and the PSLRA, to support the collapse of the culpable participation doctrine. 20 9 Despite those arguments,
the court in IPO Litigation potentially underestimated the effect that lower2 10
ing the pleading standard may have on class action securities litigation.
Due in large part to the realities of class action securities litigation, the
holding in IPO Litigation may result in a potential windfall for plaintiffs'
2
attorneys and individual plaintiffs.

11

206. See Loomis, supra note 1, at 1 (describing importance of holding in In re
Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation). "Such motions are standard operating

procedure in securities class actions, since fully a third of the time the motions
succeed and the claims are thrown out. But lawyers say that the sheer size of the
case makes this ruling especially crucial." Id.; see also id. (noting that more than
three hundred complaints against fifty-five investment banks-consolidated in In re
Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation-were pending in Southern District of New
York as of October 2004).
207. See Hoeffner & Gandhi, supranote 16, at 22-23 (summarizing "bad news"
for defense counsel regarding controlling person liability).
208. See id. (detailing possible impact of circumvention of PSLRA). The authors noted a recent holding that may expand the breadth of controlling person
claims permitted to proceed past the pleading stage. See id. (noting that recent
holding in In reEnron Corp. Securities, Derivative &ERISA Litigation,Nos. MDL-1446,
CIV.A. H-01-3624, 2003 WL 230688 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2003), may result in more
lenient pleading standards for plaintiffs). This may reflect a growing trend towards exposing individuals and corporations to liability under the Exchange Act.
See id. (noting how relaxed pleading standards may leave more professionals subject to controlling person liability).
209. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393-96 (discussing legal issues involved in Section 20 (a) claims and relevant application of PSLRA
to inquiry); see also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 14, at 1472 (discussing culpable participation doctrine post-FirstJersey). The author describes the inclusion of the culpable participation doctrine as redundant, a clear sign that many believe the
correct interpretation of Section 20(a) is that it does not require pleading by the
plaintiff with respect to culpability. See id. (noting that Second Circuit's decision in
FirstJersey did not appear to support argument that culpable participation creates
redundancy).
210. See Maich, supra note 8 (discussing potential damages facing Wall Street
on account of class action securities litigation); see also Perino, supra note 56, at
930-43 (providing statistical analysis of impact that PSLRA has had on class action
filings). See generallyBuckberg et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation:
2003 Early Update? (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.nera.com/wwt/publications/6549.pdf (same).
211. See Maich, supra note 8 (highlighting impact of denial of motion to dismiss in securities litigation). Referring to the judge's denial of defendants' motion
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V.

CONCLUSION

The Southern District of New York's holding in IPO Litigation will sig-

nificantly impact the current controversy surrounding the pleading re21 2
quirements under Section 20(a) as well as the securities markets.
Drawing support from a majority of the circuits in the United States today,
the two-prong interpretation of Section 20 (a) appears poised to eliminate
the culpable participation requirement. 2 13 Despite this fact, the implications of the holding will not be clear until the Second Circuit, or more
importantly the Supreme Court, holds in favor of either the two-prong or
three-prong test. 2 14 The various interpretations of Section 20(a), and the
confusion regarding the application of the PSLRA, require resolution in
21 5
order to clarify liability under the securities laws.
Matthew W Goulding

to dismiss in In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, one analyst stated, "We
expect this decision to trigger settlement talks, as history has shown that firms do
not 'let it ride' unless the odds are substantially in their favour, which doesn't
appear to be the case here." Id. In high-stakes litigation, the road almost always
leads to settlement and, therefore, any reduction in the pleading requirements for
securities violations increases the chances that the plaintiffs will get a better seat at
the settlement. See id. (indicating major brokerage executives may pay heavy price
for quick settlement). Most public companies are reluctant to take their chances
with a jury in this atmosphere and face stratospheric awards. See Loomis, supra
note 1 (discussing defendants' reluctance to allow jury to decide damages).
212. See Loomis, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing enormity of In re Initial Public
Offering Securities Litigation); Maich, supra note 8 (describing billions of dollars in
legal fees and potential damage awards on the line); see also Glasner, supra note 1
(describing growing appeal regarding suits against banks, issuers and directors and
officers in connection with IPO boom). The holding in In re Initial Public Offering
Securities Litigation-due to its size and historical context-is likely to play a key
role in defining the pleading requirements set forth under Section 20(a). See id.
(indicating many claims were filed with little evidence beyond anonymous news
sources).
213. See ln re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (noting that
six circuits have held there is no scienter requirement under Section 20(a)). But
see Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975) (requiring establishment of three prongs to satisfy Section 20(a) pleading requirements).
214. See In re InitialPub. Offering Sec. Litig, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (demonstrating constantly evolving law with respect to Section 20(a)); see also Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding in favor of
majority view despite previous case law upholding minority view); see also Novak v.
Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000) (denying
certiorari). "The Second Circuit will likely need to address the criticism of First
Jersey that requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove some type of culpable state of
mind creates a tension with the statute itself, which requires that the defendant
prove the affirmative defense of good faith." Slack & Thada, supra note 15, at 5.
215. See Miller, supra note 5 (describing negative implications for securities
markets if exposure to liability remains unclear).
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